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THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL
CONDITIONS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Edward J. Fuhr*
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions posits that if
the government is prohibitedfrom directly limiting the exercise
of constitutional rights in a given situation, the government
may not achieve the same result indirectly by offering benefits
subject to the condition that the recipients waive their constitutional rights. The doctrine has not been strictly applied, however, because in certain situations a condition is justified even
though a direct limit on the exercise of the right would not be.
The author argues that past approaches to determining
when a condition is legitimate have not adequately protected
constitutional rights, and he proposes a new four-part framework for making such a determination. He sets forth this approach in the specific context of conditions which restrict the
exercise of first amendment rights, and then applies it to the
conditions which accompany the receipt of Federal Election
Campaign Act funds and to conditions attached to public
employment.

IN RECENT YEARS the government has increased the number
of conditions attached to fiscal appropriations and government
employment in an attempt to alter public behavior. With this increase the courts have been more frequently called upon to assess
* Attorney Advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice; B.A., University of Virginia (1984); J.D., cum laude, University of Chicago (1987). I wish to thank
Brenda Swierenga for her helpful reviews and insights. I would also like to express my
gratitude to Geoffrey Stone, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, who taught
me much of what I know about the first amendment and whose initial comments and suggestions encouraged me to write this article. Finally, I thank Cass Sunstein, Professor of
Law, University of Chicago, who interested me in the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions and the questions it poses.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
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the constitutionality of such restrictions. Presidential candidates
have challenged the expenditure restrictions attached to federal
campaign subsidies,' government employees have repeatedly challenged various restrictions on public employment,2 and groups
that advocate the use of abortion have challenged restrictions
placed on public grants that would limit their advocacy.'
In each of these challenged contexts, the government has indirectly pressured the exercise of the first amendment right to
freedom of speech. The extent to which the government may do
this is constrained, however, by the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. This doctrine posits that a condition attached to the
grant of a governmental benefit is unconstitutional if it requires
the relinquishment of a constitutional right." The doctrine has
been used to invalidate conditions affecting interests protected by
the first, fourth, fifth, and fourteenth amendments. 5 Indeed, the
increased number of conditions limiting employee first and fourth
amendment rights have led the courts to an heightened interest in
and reliance upon the doctrine.6 At their core, the many cases now
involving unconstitutional conditions raise one fundamental question: Since the government cannot directly limit an individual's
constitutional rights absent compelling reasons, why should the

1. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)(upholding dismissal of employee
who circulated petition concerning employee morale); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)(Both Branti and Elrod were cases reinstating
an employee dismissed because of his party affiliation); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968)(disallowing dismissal of school teacher who had written a letter to a local
newspaper criticizing the allocation of school funds); McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137
(D.C. Cir. 1983)(rejecting claim of CIA agent that censorship scheme violated first
amendment).
3. Babbit v. Planned Parenthood, 789 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986), affid, 107 S. Ct.
391 (1987).
4. Hale, UnconstitutionalConditions and ConstitutionalRights, 35 COLUm. L. REv.
321 (1935). See also sources cited infra note 8.
5. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)(first amendment); Garrity
v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)(fourteenth amendment); Slochower v. Board of
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956)(fifth amendment); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees
v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(fourth amendment).
6. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 846
F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846 F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988); Serpas v.
Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1987); National Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. Weinberger,
818 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia Police
Dept., 812 F.2d 105, 111-12 (3rd Cir. 1987); Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077, 1079-80
(11 th Cir. 1986); Libertarian Party of Indiana v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981, 988-89 (7th Cir.
1984).
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government be allowed to do so indirectly by granting a government benefit only upon the waiver of a constitutional right?
This Article examines this question in the context of the first
amendment freedom of speech. Part I briefly surveys the origins
and evolutions of the doctrine. Part I also describes modern efforts
to develop a test for analyzing the constitutionality of governmental conditions, and then argues that these efforts should be interwoven to create a new four-part test. This test confronts the two
central justifications for treating indirect conditions as theoretically distinct from direct prohibitions. Namely, that the condition
is closely related to the program to which it is attached, and that
participation in the program is voluntary. This test provides the
courts with a structured framework for determining whether either of these two justifications are present in a given situation.
Part II applies this four-part test to the Federal Election Campaign Act, which conditions a presidential candidate's receipt of
federal campaign monies upon the waiver of his first amendment
right to expend privately raised funds. Part III uses the test to
explore the extent to which the government may extract waivers
of first amendment rights from public employees. The implications
of the analysis in Parts II and III are of particular significance
since Congress is now contemplating substantial revisions in the
laws regulating the first amendment interests of political candidates and government employees.'
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

At first glance, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions8

7. S. 2, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2, 133 CONG. REC. S109-13 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1987)(Bill to amend Federal Election Campaign Act); H.R. 3400, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.,
133 CONG. REc. H10045-47 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1987)(Federal Employees' Political Activities Act of 1987, designed to amend the Hatch Act and allow civilian employees the right
to participate in the political process. The Bill passed by a vote of 305 to 112 in the House
of Representatives.).
8. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been studied by a number of commentators. See, French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 GEo. LJ. 234
(1961); Hale, supra note 4; Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); O'Neil, UnconstitutionalConditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Smolla,
The Reemergence of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of
Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1982); Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the InappropriateUses of an Old Analogy,
16 UCLA L. REV. 751 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric
of "Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977 (1986); Comment, New Life for the Doctrine of Un-
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appears to exist in two forms. 9 One version of the doctrine states

that the government may never grant a
condition that the recipient not exercise
Placing such pressure upon constitutional
hibited under this version of the doctrine.

privilege subject to the
a constitutional right. 10
rights is absolutely proThe other version of the

doctrine states that the government may only condition a govern-

ment benefit on an individual's abstention from exercising a constitutional right when "the state presents compelling state interests""1 for doing so." The doctrine's historical development helps

to explain these different views.
A.

History of the Doctrine

1. Pre-doctrine: The Greater Power to Deny a Benefit Implies
a Lesser Power to Attach a Condition
The earliest disputes that gave rise to the doctrine of uncon-

stitutional conditions involved conditions imposed by state governments. In the late nineteenth century, state courts broadly con-

strued the state governments' power to pursue their own policies
despite apparent conflicts with the U.S. Constitution.1 3 One of the

most famous of these state court decisions is McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford.'4 This case involved a policeman who had been
fired for discussing politics, an activity prohibited by police regulations. Writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
Oliver Wendell Holmes responded rhetorically, if not substantively: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk

constitutional Conditions?, 58 WASH. L. REV. 679 (1983).
9. Westen, supra note 8, at 979.
10. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510
(1978)("government may not condition the receipt of its benefits upon the nonassertion of
constitutional rights even if receipt of such benefits is in all other respects a 'mere privilege' "); Hale, supra note 4, at 321 ("a condition attached by a state to a privilege is
unconstitutional if it requires the relinquishment of [a] constitutional right"); Comment,
supra note 8, at 680 ("The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prevents the government
from conditioning the grant of a benefit upon the waiver of a constitutional right.").
11. Westen, supra note 8, at 980.
12. See Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980)(The state may condition the
privilege on the waiver of a constitutional right if it has "an overriding interest of 'vital
importance' in doing so." (citation omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876); McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
14. McAuliffe, 155 Mass. at 216, 29 N.E. at 517.
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politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 1 5
Underlying his argument was the notion that if the government
had the power to completely deny a benefit, it also had the power
to place limits upon its availability. This power included the right
to grant the benefit only to persons willing to relinquish their first
amendment freedoms. What Holmes' argument ignores is the fact
that this allows enormous pressure to be placed on the exercise of
constitutional rights. 16 Substantial criticism has been levied
against this greater-includes-the-lesser argument,' 7 but the McAuliffe case and its theory still casts its shadow upon the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions. In fact, on occasion, the Supreme
Court has continued to fall prey to the rhetorical allure of the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument."8
2. The Development of the Doctrine
Federal courts first began to develop the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in order to restrain state attempts to deny certain benefits to out-of-state corporations.' 9 Such states relied upon
the "greater-includes-the-lesser" theory and argued that because
they possessed the "greater" right to exclude foreign corporations,
they also possessed the "lesser" right to admit such corporations
only upon certain terms.20 In Terral v. Burke Construction Co.,2
the Supreme Court rejected this theory and held that a state could
15. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
16. Under a greater-includes-the-lesser rationale, the government, because it possesses the right to eliminate all welfare programs, could grant benefits subject to the condi-

tion that the recipient convert to Catholicism. While all non-Catholics are denied benefits
under either approach, there is still enormous pressure being placed on their constitutional

right to practice the religious faith of their choice.
17. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1439 (1968). For an extensive criticism of the greaterincludes-the-lesser rationale set forth by Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford,
see Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1304-14.

18. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328 (1986) (the greater power to ban gambling includes the lesser power to condition a
gambling permit on surrender of some first amendment rights); Federal Energy Regulatory

Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765-67 (1982)(Court holds that because the federal
government may pre-empt state utilities regulation, it may also impose federal requirements; but Justice O'Connor's dissent branded the greater-includes-the-lesser argument as

absurd because it would allow for the dissolution of all constitutional limits on the federal
regulation of state action).
19.

See Comment, supra note 8, at 680.

20. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897); Doyle v. Continental Ins.
Co., 94 U.S. 535, 541 (1876).
21. 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
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not condition the presence of out-of-state corporations upon the
waiver of their right to litigate in federal court.
A majority of the Supreme Court finally embraced the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in 1926 in Frost & Frost
Trucking Co. v. Railroad Commission.22 Thirty-four years after
the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided McAuliffe,2" the
United States Supreme Court held that a state, with undisputed
power to prohibit the use of its public highways in proper cases,
could not require a private trucker to become a common carrier as
a condition of using its highways. The Court doubted that the
state could indirectly compel a private trucker to become a common carrier given that, under the Constitution, it could not do so
directly.24 Thus, the Court concluded:
[The state] may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor,
it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties [sic] embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.25
As the power of the states to exclude out-of-state corporations was
reduced,2 the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions lost much of
its usefulness in restricting state governmental activity.27 The doctrine was reinvigorated, however, after World War II, as the
courts increased their scrutiny of federal restrictions on free
speech and other civil rights. 28 Thus, as the doctrine had been
used at the turn of the twentieth century to restrain state efforts
to condition benefits upon the waiver of constitutional rights, during the 1950's the doctrine was used to check the federal govern22.
23.

271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926).
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying

text.
24. Frost, 271 U.S. at 594.
25. Id.
26. Compare Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871)(Court upheld a discriminatory state tax on the grounds that the state could exclude the corporation outright)

with Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667-68
(1981)(states may not freely exclude out-of-state corporations). The state's freedom with
regard to its regulation of industry has been sharply reduced with the expansion of the
Commerce Clause.
27. Comment, supra note 8, at 681-82.
28. Id. at 682. The Court's sensitivity to the constitutional questions posed by loyalty
oaths was first evidenced in American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950), where Justice Frankfurter argued that the National Labor Relations Act, which
required a loyalty oath from union leaders, was unconstitutional. Id. at 419-22.
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ment's preoccupation with imposing loyalty oaths and similar first
amendment restrictions on public employees and benefits.2 9
3.

The Present Status of the Doctrine

Despite the more recent evolution of equal protection analysis, the Supreme Court has "continued to use the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ' ' a as a check on governmental efforts to
condition public employment on the waiver of first amendment
freedoms.3 1 As the Third Circuit has recently noted, "the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that generally, a State cannot
condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression." 32 In Branti v. Finkel,"s for example, the Supreme Court disallowed the government's efforts to dismiss an employee because
of his political affiliation on the ground that to do so would impose
an "unconstitutional condition on the receipt of a public benefit
and therefore came within the rule of cases like Perry v.
' 4 In
Sindermann."
Perry,35 the court held:
[The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially,
his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government could
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or association, his exercise of those freedoms
would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the
government to "produce a result which [it] could not command
directly" [quoting Speiser v. Randall]"6 . Such interference with
37
constitutional rights is impermissible.
These cases illustrate the Court's recognition of the danger in

29. See Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment through Conditioned Public
Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 30-44 (1955)(surveying cases where the Supreme Court
was called upon to assess the constitutionality of such conditions).
30. Comment, supra note 8, at 686 n.43.

31.

See generally, Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896 (1987)(held that a

public employee could not be discharged for exercising her right to free speech under the
first amendment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983)(Court states that public
employment cannot be conditioned on the waiver of first amendment rights).
32. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia Police Dept., 812 F.2d 105, 112

(3rd Cir. 1987).
33.

445 U.S. 507 (1980).

34. Id. at 514.
35. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
36.

357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).

37. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597.
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permitting the government to grant benefits subject to the condition that the recipient give up his first amendment rights. In these
cases the conditions were struck down, but not every condition attached to a governmental program is unconstitutional. Because
virtually every government activity could be characterized as a
benefit and virtually every requirement related to that government
offering arguably infringes upon a constitutional right, an absolute
rule that all conditions are unconstitutional would mean that even
reasonable, properly motivated requirements which are essential
to a government program would not be permitted.
The difficulty with the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
to date, therefore, has been the lack of a consistent framework for
determining which conditions are permissible and which are not.
In the past courts have reached a result by engaging in a balancing of the government and the employee interests."8 In Connick v.
Myers,"9 the Supreme Court described its "task" in the same
terms it had used in Pickering v. Board of Education,40 that being: To seek "a balance between the interests of the [employee],
as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.""'
Courts continue to use such a balancing analysis today,42 despite
its weaknesses and lack of protection for first amendment rights."3
B. Past Approaches to the Doctrine
The tension between the absolute prohibitions of Frost44 and
the rhetorical power of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument in
McAuliffe45 has produced not only the balancing analysis used by
courts, but also numerous efforts by commentators to develop a
38. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891, 2896 (1987); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568
(1968); Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia Police Dept., 812 F.2d 105 (3d

Cir. 1987)("when a condition of employment impinges on first amendment interests, the
[Supreme] Court has undertaken to balance the employee and state interests.").
39. 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
40. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
41. Id. at 568.
42. See Rankin, 107 S. Ct. at 2896; FraternalOrder of Police, 812 F.2d at 112-20.
43. See infra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
44. 271 U.S. 583 (1926). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying

text.
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framework for distinguishing those benefits which are selectively
granted and do not infringe constitutional rights from those provisions which lead to a denial of benefits and do infringe constitutional rights. Three of the more significant frameworks are summarized below. Each offers a means by which to make a
determination of the condition's validity. The frameworks also
provide important insights into the problems raised by conditioning benefits on the waiver of constitutional rights.
1. Germaneness of the Condition
The first framework posits that for the conditional surrender
of a constitutional right to be acceptable, there must be a substantial relationship between the forfeiture of the individual's right, as
required by the condition, and the asserted governmental interest
in imposing the condition. Indeed, in many commentators' analyses of the doctrine, "there is a consistent perception that a condition that is unrelated to the benefit is worse than a condition that
' The Supreme Court has also been attracted to the
is germane."46
need for germaneness. In American Communications Association
v. Douds,4 7 Justice Frankfurter wrote in his concurrence that
"Congress may withhold all sorts of facilities for a better life but
if it affords them it cannot.

. .

exact surrender of freedoms unre-

'
lated to the purpose of the facilities." 48
Underlying this concern with germaneness is the belief that
conditions unrelated to the attendant benefit were attached for illegitimate purposes. It certainly remains debatable, however,
whether a condition must relate to government policy interests in
the affected program or merely relate to some government interest
at large.49 Arguably, the condition is valid if it furthers any legitimate government policy, even if that policy is distinct from the
specific government benefit or privilege to which it is attached.
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Glines5" supports this

46.

Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1350.

47. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
48. Id. at 417.
49. It could be argued that if the condition which is germane to some government
interest is attached to an unrelated program, then there should be concern that the government is singling out this program to penalize its beneficiaries. This problem may be especially acute where the condition is attached to the program as a legislative rider. In those

instances, it is conceivable that the rider enjoys little congressional support and was passed
not on its own merits but because of support for the bill to which it was attached.
50.

444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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argument. In Brown, the Court upheld a regulation which "[furthered] a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech."'" Thus, if the condition is related to some
legitimate policy, the government cannot be as easily accused of
pursuing an otherwise illegitimate restriction of constitutional
freedoms.5 2 On the other hand, a condition which furthers no legitimate government policy is much more vulnerable to challenge.
2.

Offer/Threat Framework

The second framework seeks to distinguish beneficial offers
from threats. Under this framework, the government may not
make an offer that, in fact, leaves the recipient of the offer worse
off than had the offer not been made. This framework asks
whether the condition placed on the benefit is of the "your money
or your life" variety.5 3 Such an offer does not increase the recipient's utility level, but is more analogous to a threat or coercive
offer. In Thomas v. Review Board,54 for example, the Supreme
Court found coercion, where the government pressured an employee's free exercise of religion.5 5 Similarly, in Sherbert v. Verner,5 6 the Supreme Court invalidated restrictions on unemployment compensation that denied benefits to an applicant who
refused to work for religious reasons on Saturdays. The Court
stated that, "[t]he pressure upon her to forego that practice [of
57
religion] is unmistakable.
The rationale underlying the distinction between offers and
threats is that an individual cannot complain when he is offered a
government benefit, subject to an attached condition, if he is not
made worse off by the offer, and he is free to refuse it. If the
individual wishes to waive a constitutional right as the price for a
government benefit, then she is not in a position to complain be-

51.

Id. at 354.

52. Perhaps it could be argued that the requirement of germaneness is aimed at
assuring that Congress properly deliberates the issues in a public forum. This argument is
premised on concern that there be notice to affected persons. This position is undermined,
however, by the fact that legislative riders are generally permissible.
53. Easterbrook, Insider Trading,Secret Agents, and the Protection of Information,
1981 Sup. CT. RaV. 309, 348.
54. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
55. Id. at 717-18.
56. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
57. Id. at 404.
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cause she could have walked away from the deal.5 She is not suffering an unconstitutional threat, but instead, is receiving a valueenhancing offer. If the individual is not totally free to reject the
offer, however, this line of reasoning breaks down. An offer which
cannot be freely rejected may be coercive, and the individual may
prefer that such an offer never be made.
Like the framework of germaneness, this offer/threat framework is insufficient for determining a condition's constitutionality
for at least two reasons. One problem is that it is underinclusive.
While it identifies certain conditions which clearly infringe upon
constitutional rights, other conditions, that should be struck down
as unconstitutional, would survive this framework because they
can be characterized as constituting an offer rather than a threat.
An example demonstrates this point. Assume that the government
decides to make grants of money available to persons who are
poor, as defined by a need-based test. Assume further that the
government decides to condition the grant on the recipient's
waiver of her first amendment right to speak favorably of Republican political candidates. Under the offer/threat framework, this
condition would be constitutional since the individual is free to
refuse the "offer" and preserve her first amendment rights.
A second problem with the offer/threat framework is that it
fails to consider the possibility that at some point an individual's
freedom to alienate certain rights should be limited because of the
structural benefits of certain freedoms. This analysis is especially
important in the context of waivers of first amendment rights because of the systemic benefits or externalities that result from the
free flow of information.
3. A Tri-Baseline Analysis
A third and newer framework for analyzing the validity of
conditions which affect the exercise of constitutional rights is the
tri-baseline analysis developed by Professor Seth Kreimer.5 9 This
analysis considers how three different categories of societal norms
relate to the conditioned benefit.
The first baseline examines the status quo and asks whether
the conditioning of the benefit constricts the realm of choices pre-

58. This argument is especially popular with devotees of the law and economics
school of thought. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 53.
59. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1351-72.
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viously available. This concern with a change in the status quo
reflects the view that "losing a benefit previously provided seems
different from simply never having been provided the benefit in
the first place." 60 This baseline can be analogized to legal principles found in the context of administrative law, where courts have
held that a change in an administrative agency's policies or practices requires special justifications, unlike those needed when the
agency first develops a policy.6 1 Changing the legal rules can, just
as in ex post facto cases, "creat [e] potentially harsh and inequitable defeat of expectations generated by pre-existing law." 2
This status quo baseline is not without its limitations, as even
its founder has acknowledged.6" The baseline is limited because
there may be difficulties in defining the status quo, it affords little
protection to individuals when new benefits are encumbered by a
condition requiring the waiver of a constitutional right, and the
government's ability to change pre-existing programs may be
hindered.64
The second baseline in Kreimer's analysis is an "equality"
baseline which measures the treatment of all individuals in order
to find a statistical norm. 5 This statistical norm is then used to
determine whether those who are denied benefits are being penalized because they have chosen to exercise their constitutional
rights. The more a government "singles out for exclusion from
otherwise available benefits those who exercise a particular right,
the more that choice appears to penalize that exercise. ' 66 Likewise, a government program which restricts some but not all
groups exercising a particular right is arguably a selective grant of
a benefit rather then a penalty for exercising that right.
This insight helps to explain the decision in Regan v. Taxation with Representation, inwhich the Court upheld a statute
granting a tax exemption to veterans' organizations that lobby,
while denying such an exemption to other non-profit organiza-

60. Id. at 1359.
61. See, e.g., Contractors Transp. Corp. v.'
United States, 537 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir.
1976); Brennan v. Giles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
62.

S.

BREYER

& R.

STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY

421 (2d ed. 1985).
63. Kreimer, supra note 8,at 1362-63.
64.

Id.

65. Id. at 1363.
66. Id. at 1367.
67. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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tioris. The statute was viewed as conferring a benefit on veterans'
organizations rather than as inflicting a penalty on other organizations for exercising their first amendment rights. Once the government's interests are recognized as providing a financial reward to
those who have fought for the nation's security, it becomes clear
that other lobbying organizations are not being penalized, but
rather, the veterans are receiving a deserved benefit.
The equality baseline, however, is not flawless. Statistical
norms are inherently imprecise and difficult to calculate. The disparate treatment of minor and major political parties by the Federal Election Campaign Act illustrates this difficulty. The Act
provides twenty million dollars to only the two major parties,6 8
and thus the question becomes whether the "statistical norm" is to
receive funds or not to receive funds. It could be argued that the
norm is the denial of public funds, since only the two main parties
receive the large subsidy. Thus, the Republican and Democratic
parties are being singled out for a bonus. On the other hand, given
that the majority of the population belongs to one of the two major parties, it is difficult to view the minor parties as the statistical
norm. From this view, the denial of funding to smaller parties assumes the character of a penalty.
The third component in Kreimer's tri-baseline analysis is a
"prediction" analysis which questions whether the government
would provide the benefit if it could not impose the condition. 9 If
the government would provide the benefit even if it could not attach the condition, then it appears more likely that the government is "exploiting the particular need of the recipient rather than
advancing a public interest."' 0 Thus, a government that would
provide the benefit with or without the attached condition, but
chooses to attach the condition, can be presumed to have done so
not for the purpose of furthering the government's interests in providing the benefit but for the purpose of pressuring the recipient's
exercise of his constitutional rights. This analysis is similar to the
germaneness analysis71 in that it seeks to discover conditions with
illegitimate purposes behind them by considering the nature of the
attached program. This "prediction" analysis goes beyond the ger-

68.
U.S.C. §
69.
70.
71.

2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(B) (1986). "Major" political parties are defined in 26
9002(6) (1986).
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
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maneness analysis, however, because it also focuses on the extent
to which the condition furthers the government interests, how
much the government values the condition, and the possibility that
the government has alternatives other than imposition of the condition which may be less intrusive upon first amendment interests.
Governmental attempts to pressure the exercise of a constitutional right, even if somewhat germane to a legitimate government
interest, are suspect unless the condition is so important that the
government would rather not provide the benefit at all than provide it without the attached condition. 72 Given the importance of
constitutional rights, the government should not be allowed to
pressure the right unless the condition furthers significant interests. One measure of the intensity of the government's interests is
whether the government feels strongly enough about the condition
that it would eliminate the benefit in its entirety if it could not
attach such a condition.
Like the other baselines and frameworks, the "prediction"
baseline has its weaknesses.7 3 One such weakness is its failure to
acknowledge that government programs and benefits differ in their
degree of importance. As a result, it may not always be easy to
draw inferences from the conclusion that the government would or
would not provide the benefit without the attached condition. For
example, if it can be predicted that the government would discontinue a very important program rather than provide it without the
attached condition, then arguably the condition is necessary and
legitimate. If the program is not so significant, however, there is
less reason to assume that the condition is especially necessary,
and courts should be less concerned by the proposition that the
government might abandon the program if it cannot attach the
condition.

72.

Kreimer sees this governmental advantage in imposing such conditions in more

economic terms:
This baseline has the happy property of forcing the government to pay fair measure for the forfeiture of rights. It cannot purchase rights by granting benefits
that the victim would receive anyhow. One of the dangers of allocative sanctions
arises from the fact that, while the government must expend resources to find
the victims of penal sanctions, a recipient of benefits seeks out the government.
In a case in which the government would offer the benefits in the usual course of
events, the additional coercive power implicit in a condition is essentially free.
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1372-73.
73. "[T]his baseline gets the courts into the risky business of predicting what the
government would do, and the court's normative vision of the public interest will inevitably
intrude." Id. at 1373.
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On the whole, the tri-baseline framework offers important insights into the problems raised by conditions that require the
waiver of a constitutional right. The framework's central weakness
is its underinclusiveness. A condition requiring the waiver of a
constitutional right, that is attached to a very small, insignificant,
new government program, would likely survive the tri-baseline
analysis despite furthering no legitimate government interests. Because such a program is new, the status quo baseline would probably not act to prohibit the condition. Also, it is possible that the
government may abandon the program if the condition is struck
down, especially when it is a small program. This would prevent
the condition from being suspected under the "prediction" baseline. Finally, it is conceivable that the few beneficiaries of the program may be characterized as being the recipients of a selective
benefit, which would prevent the equality baseline from signaling
a problem. Even if that were not the case, however, the baselines
point two to one in favor of the condition being constitutional,
even though no government interests are served7 4 Thus, it appears
that the baselines should be modified to minimize their limitations, increase their precision, and enhance their insights.
C. Towards a New Framework
As the above analysis reveals, each framework has its flaws.
While they each identify certain categories of conditions that
should be invalidated, no one question or approach consistently
resolves the issues raised by conditions requiring the waiver of
constitutional rights. Nevertheless, each of them identifies important issues and generates important insights into the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions.
Because of the difficulties in formulating a framework for
consistently evaluating the validity of conditions which require the
waiver of a constitutional right, a variety of balancing or reasonableness tests have been advocated. 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court
has on occasion pursued such an approach.76
In Slochower v. Board of Education,7 the Court formulated
the following reasonableness test: "To state that a person does not
74. This example shows that the tri-baseline analysis does not accurately distinguish
offers from threats in all cases. See Id.at 1352-59.

75.

Id. at 1347-51.

76.

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

77. 350 U.S. 551 (1976).
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possess a constitutional right to government employment [or other
valuable government benefit] is only to say that he must comply
with reasonable, lawful, and nondiscriminatory terms laid down
by the proper authorities.""8 An even more general, less restrictive
approach can be found in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,7 9 where Justice Frankfurter argued that the reasonableness of the condition should be judged by applying the test to
"all relevant factors." 80 The difficulty with this approach, however, is that a mere balancing of interests affords little protection
to individuals from intrusion on their constitutional rights.8 "
This argument against the balancing of interests test is not
new. A commentator has stated that "the Pickering balancing
doctrine

. .

. [has] inadequately protected public employees' right

to free speech [since the courts] have neglected to explicate employees' interests in expression." 82 The voice of criticism has also
been heard in the Supreme Court. Justice Douglas made the point
vigorously in his dissent in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers.3 In that case a
majority of the Court upheld the Hatch Act's wide-ranging limitations on the political activities of government employees by using a balancing analysis. 84 Justice Douglas argued, however, that
what an employee does on his own time is beyond the scope of
government regulation unless what he does impairs his efficiency
or other facets of the merits of his job.85 Conditions may not be
attached that infringe upon the employee's interests in freedom of
speech. 86
The difficulties presented by the use of an ambiguous balancing test were also evident in Connick v. Myers.87 In that case, an
employee in a district attorney's office was fired for distributing a

78. Id. at 555.
79. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
80. Id. at 82.
81. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 137-46 (1959)(Black, J., dissenting) ("I do not agree that law directly abridging First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial balancing process"). See also Frantz, Is the First
Amendment Law? - A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 729 (1963).
82. Note, Developments in the Law - Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1757 (1984).
83. 413 U.S. 548, 595-600 (1973) (Douglas J., dissenting).
84. 413 U.S. at 564-68.
85. Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).
87. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

1988-89]

CONDITIONS

questionnaire to her fellow assistant district attorneys which
sought information concerning office performance and employee
morale. The questionnaire also asked "whether the Assistants felt
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates." 88 The Court found the dismissal constitutional, despite the fact that there had been no showing of "any
evidence to indicate that the [employee's] work performance was
adversely affected by her expression," 89 and even though at least
one question posed in the questionnaire was found to "touch upon
a matter of public concern." 90 In a sharply critical dissent, Justice
Brennan accused the majority of misapplying the Pickering balancing test in holding that Myers could be dismissed even though
the questionnaire was of public interest. 91 Furthermore, Brennan
argued that the majority distorted the balancing analysis by
double-counting the government's interest. 92
Allowing the dismissal of an employee who would provide the
public with valuable information about the efficiency and political
pressures of a district attorney's office would certainly seem to
threaten her first amendment rights. "[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of that amendment [is] to
protect the free discussion of government affairs." 9 This includes
the "manner in which government is operated or should be oper' The potential for the chilling of free speech is enormous.
ated."94
As the Court has observed before, "the threat of dismissal from
'95
public employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech."
This lack of protection for individuals' constitutional rights
can, however, be remedied. 98 What is needed is a framework
which recognizes that constitutional rights are not to be cavalierly
pressured. Indeed, the factors and issues that must be considered
have all been raised by the three frameworks discussed earlier.
The major difficulty with each of those frameworks, however, was
their underinclusiveness.

88.

Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D. La. 1981).

89. Id. at 759.
90. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149.
91. Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 157-58.
93. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
94. Id.

95.

Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).

96.

For an analysis of how Connick would fare under the new framework, see infra

notes 260-76 and accompanying text.
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Before describing the new framework, it is important to emphasize what is at stake in such an analysis. Cases involving unconstitutional conditions raise one fundamental question: Since
the government cannot directly limit an individual's first amendment interests, absent compelling reasons, why should the government be allowed to do so indirectly by conditioning a government
benefit on the waiver of that constitutional right? If the government could enforce the limitation in its own right, without reference to a government benefit, then attaching it to a benefit does
not raise the question of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Thus, in cases involving conditions placed upon a government benefit, the first question is whether the government could directly
limit the exercise of such rights by individuals not involved with
the government program. This Article examines two areas within
the context of the first amendment where it is clear that the government cannot directly limit its exercise: presidential candidates
may not be prohibited from spending unlimited funds, and citizens
cannot be prohibited from contributing to the debate on matters
of public interest. The question that arises, then, is whether the
government can bring about the same result indirectly by denying
public funding or government employment to candidates and employees who refuse to waive their constitutional rights.
There are at least two situations in which the indirect denial
of a constitutional right may be acceptable, even though a direct
prohibition would be unacceptable. 97 First, the condition may be
an important part of the government program to which it is attached, such that it would be difficult to implement the program
without it. Second, participation in the program and the acceptance of the waiver condition may be completely voluntary. Such a
waiver may indeed be significantly different from a direct prohibition which is compulsory. The role, then, of a framework for analyzing unconstitutional conditions is to explore the relationship between the condition and the program to which it is attached, as
well as the extent to which participation in the program is voluntary. If the program is not voluntary, or if the conditions are not
sufficiently related to the attached program, then the waiver requirement should be analyzed by the courts no differently than a
direct prohibition of the exercise of a constitutional right.

97. A third reason that has been cited is the greater-includes-the-lesser rationale.
This, however, has been shown to be an unprincipled and substantively hollow justification.
See supra notes 13-25 and accompanying text.
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The new framework should examine the presence of these
justifications while minimizing the difficulties seen in the earlier
frameworks. The framework proposed by this Article is such a
framework. It consists of four inquiries, three of which examine
the relationship between the condition and the program, and a
fourth which considers whether participation in the program is
truly voluntary. The first inquiry asks whether the condition is
germane to the attached program. If the condition which requires
the waiver of a constitutional right is unrelated to the program,
then there is no reason why the required waiver of the constitutional right should be constitutional, because it is attached to a
government program, when it would be unconstitutional
otherwise.
The second inquiry explores whether the government's condition treats people situated similarly, with respect to the government's interests, in a similar fashion. This inquiry foregoes
Kreimer's interest in making a quantitative determination of the
statistical norm, and instead, focuses upon whether the purpose
behind the condition is fulfilled when it is applied to particular
individuals. This inquiry essentially asks whether the government
interest in conditioning the benefit is tailored as narrowly as possible, so that it affects only those persons which it must affect to
fulfill the government interests. If an individual's exercise of his or
her first amendment rights does not threaten legitimate government interests, then there is no reason to extract a waiver of those
rights from such individuals as a condition to providing the government benefit.
The third inquiry explores the necessity for and the extent of
the government interests in attaching the waiver condition to the
government benefit. The less significant the need for requiring the
waiver of a constitutional right as a condition to the program, the
stronger the argument that courts should analyze such a condition
in the same fashion as they would analyze a direct prohibition.
The first three inquiries analyze the relationship between the
condition and the attached program. The fourth and final inquiry
in the framework explores whether participation in the program,
which requires the waiver of a constitutional right, is completely
voluntary. If there is pressure to participate in the program, and
thus pressure to waive constitutional rights, then the waiver condition is not so different from a direct prohibition and it should be
analyzed as such. This inquiry is not significant if the first three
inquiries show the condition to be unrelated to a.legitimate gov-
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ernment interest. In that instance, there is no reason why the voluntariness of the waiver should save it from constitutional attack.
This inquiry is important when the condition passes the first three
inquiries, but participation is then found to be less than completely voluntary.
Under this four-part approach, a condition would be unconstitutional if 1) it was not germane to a legitimate government
interest, 2) it treated similarly situated people differently, 3) it
was not a significant part of the benefit program, or 4) participation in the program was compelled. A condition should be found
unconstitutional in this event, since the individual's constitutional
rights have been infringed, and neither of the justifications for
permitting such indirect infringement is present.
This new four-part framework provides specific and necessary
guidance for the courts when confronted with conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. Even though the
four inquiries may not always yield easy or certain answers, they
do assure that the courts are analyzing the relevant issues. Rather
than engaging in unstructured balancing, with this framework the
courts can analyze the conditions in a systematic and consistent
fashion,9" which will enable them to avoid the difficulties evidenced by Connick9 9 and to bypass the tempting rhetoric of the
greater-includes-the-lesser argument."' 0
D.

Applying the Framework

Two interesting situations involving the first amendment will
be examined with this new four-part framework." 1 The first situation to be analyzed involves the requirement that presidential candidates waive their first amendment rights as a condition to the
receipt of campaign subsidies. 10 2 This subject is of special interest
because it involves the core political values of the first amend-

98. Kreimer perceived a similar advantage with his tri-baseline framework.
Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1378.
99. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
100. One court has observed that "'the greater power includes the lesser' is the
traditional antagonist of the 'unconstitutional conditions' principle." Serpas v. Schmidt,
827 F.2d 23, 39 (7th Cir. 1987). See also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
101. While this framework may well offer important insights into conditions involving the waiver of other constitutional rights, that is a subject beyond the scope of this
Article.
102. See infra notes 106-202 and accompanying text.
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ment. Furthermore, it comes at a time when Congress is considering legislation which would expand the scope of the statute to include candidates for the U.S. Senate, as well as add additional
restrictions for candidates already subject to the Act. The second
situation to be analyzed involves the conditioning of public employment on the employees' waiver of their first amendment
rights, a condition which in the past has resulted in the courts'
unstructured balancing tests."0 3
This Article only explores examples of conditions which restrict first amendment rights. There are several reasons for this
limited focus. First, the government's motivations for attaching
conditions that restrict the flow of speech are often more suspect
than those relating to conditions affecting other constitutional
rights. Government officials have a strong incentive to reduce the
flow of critical speech capable of destroying their political popularity. Furthermore, even those persons in power who are not subject to political pressure may prefer an environment in which their
policies are not open to regular challenge. Additionally, the first
amendment, perhaps more than any other amendment, serves systemic interests beyond those realized by the individual who is exercising the constitutional right. As stated by the Supreme Court,
the first amendment's protection of "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."1 4 Thus, an individual's waiver of first amendment rights
implicates concerns that may not be protected by the individual
who is considering whether to waive them. This fact strenghens
the argument for special judicial scrutiny. Also, conditions which
require the waiver of first amendment rights may frequently be
more difficult for courts to resolve because of the ease with which
the government can assert that the condition furthers a legitimate
government interest. Indeed, it is in the context of first amendment conditions that the Supreme Court has often struggled in its
analysis.10 5 Finally, the Court's predilection for a balancing analysis in the case of first amendment conditions is particularly at
odds with the traditional strict scrutiny review employed when the
government restricts first amendment rights. For these reasons,
first amendment conditions are of special concern.

103.

See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.

104.

Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964). See also A.
255-56 (1948).

FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT,

105.

See, e.g., cases cited supra note 38.
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THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT ANALYZED

The Federal Election Campaign Act'0 6 and its subsequent
amendments of 1974107 provide for the public financing of presidential political campaigns. 08 Before any candidate is allocated
money, however, he or she must agree to waive his or her first
amendment right to raise and expend unlimited private funds. 10 9
Challenges to the constitutionality of various provisions of the
Act are nothing new. In the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo, 0 the

Supreme Court held that the Act's campaign expenditure ceilings
violated the first amendment. "[R]estrictions on the amount of
money a person or group can spend on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression
by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their
expression, and the size of the audience reached.""' The Court,
however, determined that restrictions on the size of individual contributions" 2 were constitutional." 3 Despite the expansive nature
106. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971)(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§
431-456 (1986)).
107. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).
108. Money is allocated to presidential candidates according to the level of support
enjoyed by their political party in the previous presidential election. The political parties
are then categorized as major, minor, or new parties. Major political parties are those
which received more than 25 % of the vote in the preceding presidential election. 26 U.S.C.
§ 9002(b) (1986). They are eligible for subsidies of $20 million, which is adjusted to account for inflation. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(b)(1)(B) (1986); 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c)(1) (1986). In
1984, this adjusted amount was $29.4 million. To receive the funds the major party candidates must forego all private contributions and agree to limit total expenditures to the
amount of subsidy. 26 U.S.C. § 9003(b)(1) (1986). Minor parties are those which received
more than 5% but less than 25% of the vote in the preceding presidential election. 26
U.S.C. § 9001(7) (1986). They are entitled to subsidies proportional to their share of the
vote in the preceding or current election, whichever was higher. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(2)(A)
(1986). Finally, there are the "new" parties which constitute all parties which received less
than 5% of the vote in the current election. 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(3) (1986). They are
eligible for subsidies only if they receive more than 5 % of the vote in the current election.
Candidates of minor or new parties who accept subsidies are permitted to supplement the
public funds with private contributions, as long as their total expenditures do not exceed
the amount of the major party subsidy.
109. The statute states:
In order to be eligible to receive any payments . . .the candidates . . .shall
certify to the [Federal Election] Commission under penalty of perjury, that (1)
[they] will not incur qualified campaign expenses in excess of the aggregate payments . . . and (2) no contributions to defray qualified campaign expenses have
been or will be accepted . . ..
26 U.S.C. § 9003(b) (1986).
110. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
111. Id. at 19.
112. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (1986) limits individual contributions to $1,000.
113. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41.
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of the per curiam opinion," 4 the Court devoted only a footnote 5
to the issues raised by the requirement that candidates waive their
right to unlimited expenditures as a condition to the receipt of
funds under the Act.
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns
and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement
by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations.
Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forego private
fundraising and accept public funding."1
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was not mentioned by
the Court nor was it argued by the parties. The reason for this
was not that the doctrine was dead, but that the limitation on
spending by presidential candidates which was at issue applied to
all candidates, whether or not they received federal money. Thus,
in Buckley the Court was asked to assess the constitutionality of
the absolute expenditure limit which applied to all candidates, not
the limit imposed as a condition on the recipients of public
financing. 8
Four years later, in 1980, a federal district court dealt more
directly with the constitutional questions raised by the requirement that recipients of public funds waive a first amendment
right." 9 Rather than dismiss the challenge to the condition's constitutionality by citing Buckley"' as controlling precedent, the
court engaged in an analysis that tracked various aspects of the

114.
115.

The per curiam opinion totaled just under 300 pages.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.

116. Id. Examination of the analogy drawn in this footnote, between a candidate
who voluntarily restricts contributions to $100 and a candidate who accepts public financing and its attendant conditions, demonstrates the invalidity of the implied legal conclusion.
A candidate who voluntarily limits the size of contributions he will accept or the amount he
will spend receives no benefits, suffers no harm, and is otherwise unaffected by the government when making that decision. With FECA, however, it cannot be so readily asserted
that the individual's decision with regard to his first amendment rights is unaffected by
government policy. See infra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
117. Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 348.
118. Even if the Supreme Court had fully analyzed the issues, raised by the condition, in 1976, it is not clear what result the Court would have reached. Subsequent experience with FECA and recent analyses of election financing reflect significant changes in
prevailing attitudes toward the role of money in political campaigns. See infra notes 133-49
and accompanying text.
119. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp 280
(S.D.N.Y.), afid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.'
Unfortunately, the
court's resolution of the issues was flawed in several respects.' 22
Nevertheless, even if the court's conclusions were questionable,
the court did recognize the importance of analyzing voluntariness
and of analyzing the condition's relevance to the financing program. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was affirmed
summarily without opinion. 2 3
It is conceivable that during a presidential election a candidate could, by more effectively portraying the coercive nature of
the condition, successfully challenge the Act's constitutionality. In
1986, the Supreme Court again indicated that summary affirmances do not render later challenges useless.' 24 Indeed, although
"summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value, 'they
are' .
not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court treating the question on the merits.' 25 The
probability of success in a suit challenging the condition is enhanced by the evolving belief that the candidate with the most
money may not have the political advantage once thought. 26 This
evolving belief weakens one of the justifications for the spending
limitation.
Application of the new four-part framework, developed in
Part I for analyzing potentially unconstitutional conditions, suggests that the Act's expenditure limit should be struck down. It
also suggests that current congressional efforts to expand the
scope of the Act and to increase the number of conditions attached to the acceptance of Act funds are contrary to constitutionally protected liberties. The specific application of the new
framework, developed in this Article, to the Federal Election
Campaign Act supports this argument.

121. Indeed, the court cited cases often associated with the doctrine, including Perry
v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926).
122. For specific criticism of the court's analysis, see infra notes 155-73 and accompanying text.
123. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
124. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 (1986).
125. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). See also Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 500 (1981)("summary actions do not have the same
authority as do decisions rendered after plenary consideration").
126. G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); Fleischman &
McCorkle, Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of Campaign Finance Reform, I J. L. & POL. 211 (1984); Margolis, When More Isn't Necessarily Better,
Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1987, §1, at 15, col. 1.
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A. Germaneness of the Condition
The Federal Election Campaign Act offers presidential candidates more than twenty million dollars, in 1974 dollars, with
which to campaign. This money is not given for free, however,
because the candidate must waive his or her first amendment right
to raise and expend unlimited private funds in order to receive it.
The governmental interests which have been cited as justifications
for the Act's existence are: 1) to prevent political candidates from
becoming too dependent on the wealthy underwriters of campaigns who may seek to extract political favors in exchange for
contributions, 2) to equalize the candidates' respective abilities to
campaign, and 3) to assure every candidate a minimally sufficient
cache of money with which to campaign. 27 The germaneness
component of the four-part framework explores the relationship
between the waiver condition and each of these justifications.
1. Eliminating Dependence on Wealthy Financiers
The first asserted interest, eliminating dependence on the
wealthy private financiers of election campaigns, does not depend
on the exclusion of private contributions from the election process.
A sufficiently large public grant should make a candidate, if not
indifferent to private contributors, much less subservient to them.
Candidates who have received a large grant of public money will
be under much less pressure to succumb to the political demands
of the big financiers. This argument conforms to basic economicbased intuitions, which assume that a candidate will only accept
contributions or spend money to the point that the marginal benefits exceed the marginal costs. A government grant of more than
twenty million dollars causes the marginal value of an additional,
privately contributed dollar to drop significantly. Because the
marginal benefit of contributions has decreased while the cost, in
the form of catering to these special interest groups, has remained
constant, candidates will be less interested in such private
contributions.
The validity of contribution ceilings 2 ' lends further support
to the argument that it is unnecessary to require candidates to
127. Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of PoliticalSpeech, 1976 Sup.
CT. REv. 1, 29-30.
128. Currently, individuals may contribute only $1,000 to a presidential candidate. 2
U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (1986).
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waive their constitutional right to raise and expend unlimited private funds in order to prevent them from being dependent on
wealthy financiers. The Buckley' Court's approval of such ceilings renders the fear of candidates being "bought" largely unfounded. Indeed, Congress' efforts to place ceilings on the contributions of Political Action Committees (PACs) are evidence that
Congress recognizes that the imposition of contribution limits is
an effective way to solve the problem of candidate dependence on
wealthy financiers.
With contribution ceilings in place, it is unlikely that a presidential candidate will feel beholden to an individual who is only
permitted to contribute $1,000, given that the candidate will have
already received more than twenty million dollars from the government. 130 The reason PACs have the influence they do is because the size of their contributions is not currently so limited.
The effect of the large government subsidy on the candidate's
marginal benefit in accepting private contributions and the constitutionality of contribution ceilings, make it difficult to accept that
the waiver by candidates of their constitutional rights significantly
furthers the government's interest in preventing undue dependence
on private financiers. Thus, there does not appear to be a substantial relation between this first government interest in preventing
dependence or wealthy financiers and the condition restricting the
constitutional right to expend unlimited private funds.
2.

Equalizing Political Opportunities

The second governmental interest which the Act seeks to further is the equalization of the candidates' abilities to communicate
with the public and thus their chances for victory. 1' 3 Assuming
this to be a legitimate governmental interest, it is not clear why
"limiting candidates expenditures [is] more constitutionally palat1 32
able as a condition than as a ban.'
The apparent justification for the condition is that if the government could not restrict campaign expenditures when it granted
campaign subsidies, the congressional objective of equalizing elec-

129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
130. In 1984, the public subsidy was $29.4 million. It is estimated that in 1988 the
public subsidy will amount to $45 million per candidate. N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1987, at B5,
col. 1.

131. See Polsby, supra note 127, at 30.
132.

Id.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS

1988-891

tion results by breaking the link between the candidate with the
most money and victory would be frustrated. Otherwise, candidates would still raise private funds, knowing that the candidate
who had the most money enjoyed a higher probability of being
elected. This argument, however, rests upon premises that are
unproven.
The key premise in such a position is the "drown-out" theory." as This theory posits that the spending disparity between candidates is a vital factor in determining election winners, regardless
13 4
of the aggregate level of spending achieved by each candidate.
Evidence now available, however, strongly refutes this proposition.135 Representative of this growing recognition is the view of
Professor Jacobson: "The problem is not equalizing the amount
between candidates but rather simply getting money to challengers so that they can mount competitive races."136 Actually, the
campaign finance variable most significantly related to election results was the absolute amount of money raised by the challenger
rather than the relative spread between the spending of the two
candidates. In short, what mattered was not how much money a
candidate had relative13to7 his or her opponent, but whether each
candidate had enough.
The most dramatic evidence of the absence of a "drown-out"
effect can be seen in some of the recent presidential primary campaigns in which the FECA provided a matching grant floor of
public subsidization.138 In 1976, unknown challenger Jimmy

133. Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?,82 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 640 (1982) ("Excessive and unequal

spending by one side interferes with the other's communication and, if the inequality is
great enough, can effectively and completely drown out the other's message to the
voters.").
134. Id.
135. See G. JACOBSON, supra note 126, at 218 (citing Public Financingof Federal
Elections: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate
Comm. on Rules and Admin., 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 151 (1973)(statement of Rep.
Frenzel)); Margolis, supra note 126.
136. G. JAcOBsON, supra note 126, at 218.
137. Id. at 218 ("It is the absolute rather than the relative amount spent by challengers that matters."). See also, Margolis, supra note 126,

In politics, as in life, money is important. In politics, as in life, its importance
can be overstated, and often is . . . .The real truth about money in politics is
that a candidate does not need more than his opponent as long as he or she has

enough to run a campaign - to hire a staff, rent office space, pay the phone bills
and buy enough TV time to convey the desired message.

Id. at 15, col. 1.
138.

After a candidate has raised at least $5,000 in each of 20 states, counting only
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Carter was certainly not drowned out by the much larger campaign bankroll that most of his fellow Democrats enjoyed. Similarly, in 1980, John Connally was unable to drown out the voices
of his opponents, despite the fact that he began the primary season with over two million dollars, which was more than the combined amount of all other Republican candidates. Like Carter, the
other Republican contenders in 1980 were able to raise enough
money to secure matching funds and thus gained an adequate
floor of resources to counter Connally during the primary season.
These examples reflect the central point that elections are lost
not because a candidate has been outspent, but rather, because he
or she has not been able to raise and spend the minimum amount
necessary to wage an effective campaign. Given this finding, it becomes difficult to argue that the equality purpose behind campaign subsidies is subverted by allowing private contributions and
expenditures beyond the amount publicly granted. Indeed, no substantial relation can be found between the equalization of candidates' respective campaign prospects and the forfeiture by the
candidates of their first amendment rights.
3. Providing Candidates a Minimum Amount of Money
A third public purpose behind public financing may be to assure that presidential candidates have a minimum amount of
money available with which to campaign. This purpose, however,
is consistent with allowing candidates to raise and spend additional private funds. The reasons for providing candidates with a
floor or base amount of money with which to campaign do not
support placing a ceiling on candidate expenditures. If the reasons
for such a floor are related in any way to the issue of who wins
elections, and included in that issue would be the related question
of who runs for president, the imposition of ceilings has no effect,
since as long as a candidate has enough money he or she can compete effectively. 139

the first $250 from each person contributing to the candidate, a subsidy is provided according to a matching formula: each qualified candidate is entitled to a sum equal to the total
private contributions received, disregarding contributions from a person to the extent that
total contributions to the candidate by that person exceed $250. 26 U.S.C. § 9033(b)(3)
(1986); 26 U.S.C. § 9034(a) (1986). Payments to any candidate may not exceed 50% of
the overall expenditures. 26 U.S.C. § 9034(b) (1986).
139. Similarly, if the grant is designed to encourage the belief that an individual
need not be wealthy to run for President, restrictive conditions seem to be unnecessary.
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Direction of the First Part: Conditions Not Germane

The analysis of the first component of the new framework
suggests that there is no good reason for the Court to allow a
restraint on expenditures as a condition to public financing. Such
limits do not serve or promote Congress' asserted purposes for enacting the campaign finance laws. Indeed, allowing candidates to
freely exercise their first amendment right to unlimited campaign
expenditures is logically consistent with the government's interests
in public financing. In fact, such restraints are not only unnecessary but also counter-productive. Candidates who are permitted to
spend additional funds are more likely to have a sufficient amount
with which to campaign than if they are denied the opportunity to
do so. Furthermore, if a candidate is denied public financing because she refuses to waive her first amendment rights, then she
will be pressured to make promises to contributors to secure
funds. Thus, under this first variable in the framework, the condition appears substantially unrelated and not germane to the governnient's three reasons for providing public financing and may
even be counterproductive.
B.

Applying the Condition: Similarly Situated Parties?

The second part of the new framework seeks to determine
whether the government programs confer a benefit upon a selective group, or instead impose a penalty on those who exercise a
particular constitutional right. Thus, it is necessary to determine
whether a candidate who complies with the condition and receives
the benefit is situated, with respect to the Act's purposes, similarly
to one who does not. "To deprive a citizen of a benefit available to
those who are similarly situated because of her exercise of constitutional rights is to impinge on protected liberties."' 40
As noted earlier, three general purposes underlie the public
financing of presidential election campaigns: 1) to prevent candidates from becoming too dependent on wealthy contributors, 2) to
equalize the candidates' respective opportunities, and 3) to assure
every candidate a minimum cache of money. 141 It is by reference
to these purposes that it must be determined whether a candidate
who agrees to waive the first amendment right to make unlimited
expenditures is similarly situated to the candidate who does not. If
140.
141.

Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1365.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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they are similarly situated with respect to the asserted governmental purposes, then it appears that rather than conferring a selective benefit, the government is making a benefit generally available to all persons so situated and denying it to particular
candidates because they chose to retain their first amendment
rights.
With respect to the first governmental purpose, the candidates are arguably similarly situated, since it does not appear that
giving money to candidates, regardless of whether or not they
waived their first amendment right to raise and spend additional
private money, would cause them to become reliant on wealthy
financiers. Restricting campaign expenditures is, at best, an indirect way to further this first interest. The more direct approach is
to limit the amount that a candidate may accept from any contributor. 4 Also, mandatory disclosure of all significant contributors 143 directly and significantly furthers the government's interest
in reducing a candidate's reliance on contributors who would seek
to influence the elected official. Furthermore, the best way to minimize a candidate's need to solicit large sums of money necessary
for the campaign would be for the government itself to provide
such funds. The more money provided by the government, the less
that a candidate must generate privately. The less a candidate
needs to raise privately, the less pressure there will be on a candidate to make implicit promises of future favors to secure private
funds. Thus, the denial of funds to a candidate who refuses to
waive his or her first amendment right undermines the government's first purpose for establishing the program. With respect to
the first interest, the candidates are similarly situated.
The second governmental interest, equalizing the candidates'
opportunities, also does not seem to warrant a distinction between
candidates who do and do not waive their first amendment rights.
Recent elections demonstrate that the financial key to winning an
election is not spending more money than the opposition but
spending enough. 4 Thus, assuming that it is a legitimate function of the government to equalize the election prospects of the
various candidates, it does not seem that requiring candidates to
waive their first amendment rights is necessary to achieve that ob-

142. The size of contributions to a candidate and his authorized political committee
are already limited to $1,000. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(A) (1986).
143. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 432, 434 (1986).
144. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
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jective because the additional amount spent will not be the key to
winning the election. More significantly, the Supreme Court has
rejected the equalization principle as a permissible justification for
expenditure restrictions.145 "[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment .. ."" For these reasons, candidates who do and

candidates who do not waive their first amendment rights are similarly situated with regard to furthering the government interest in
equalizing election prospects.
The third governmental interest, providing a minimum cache
of money to the candidates, does not justify treating a candidate
differently because of his or her exercise of the first amendment
right to raise and spend private funds. A candidate's need for such
a minimum sum is not dependent on the decision to reserve the
first amendment right. Furthermore, there is no suggestion to be
found that the denial of funds to candidates who refuse to waive
their rights represents a judgment that the candidates do not need
the money. Thus, with respect to the need for a minimum cache of
money, the candidates are similarly situated. In fact, to deny the
funds to a candidate who reserves his or her first amendment
rights undermines this third governmental purpose.
This analysis indicates that the FECA and its condition requiring recipients of funds to waive their first amendment right to
raise and spend private funds does not justifiably distinguish between complying and noncomplying candidates. With respect to
the three identifiable purposes of public financing, the candidate
who reserves his right and the candidate who does not are similarly situated. Thus, the campaign subsidy and its attendant condition more accurately constitute a generally available benefit that
is denied to those who reserve their first amendment right than a
selectively available benefit offered to those who fulfill the Act's
purposes. In this light, it is clear that candidates are being penalized for exercising their constitutional rights.
C. Significance of the Government's Interests
The third inquiry of the framework explores the significance
of the government's interests as evidenced by what the govern-

145.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976).

146.

Id.
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ment would do if it could not impose the condition. Thus, it is
necessary to determine whether the government would continue to
provide campaign financiflg in the event that it could not attach
the condition to the subsidy.
In the context of the Federal Election Campaign Act, it is
unlikely that Congress would abandon the financing program if
courts severed the waiver condition. In fact, it is especially difficult to see why funding should be stopped, given that the waiver
condition is not germane to the achievement of the subsidies' purposes, 117 candidates who comply with the condition do not further
governmental interests any more than candidates who do not comply, 14 8 and in some instances the condition actually undercuts the
program's effectiveness.1 49 Thus, if the government remains committed to the interests underlying the program's existence, it can
be confidently predicted that Congress would continue the program. If the government's purpose for the program is to enable it
to do indirectly that which could not be done directly-establish
restrictions on the amount of money spent in a campaign-then
Congress may well abandon the program. It should be noted, however, that such a purpose is clearly unconstitutional. 5 '
Additionally, as a matter of pure politics, it is especially unlikely that a Congress filled with Republicans and Democrats
would vote to discontinue the program if the waiver condition was
disallowed. Contemplation of such a cut-off would likely bring
howls of protest from presidential aspirants who are likely to possess significant influence on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, the major
parties would certainly be loathe to discontinue the program since
the provision of more than twenty million dollars is only available
to the two major parties and, therefore, strongly reinforces the
status quo.' 5 ' Thus, the condition itself appears to be of little sig-

147. See supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.
149. For instance, if the purpose of providing a minimum cache of funds to all candidates is defeated, the denial of funds to candidates who reserve their constitutional rights
increases their need to pander to financiers, and the imposition of an expenditure ceiling to
achieve equality of opportunity seems unnecessary and clearly in conflict with Buckley's
rejection of that notion.
150. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 108 for the Act's definition of major and minor parties. In Buckley, the Court held these protectionist aspects of the FECA to be not constitutionally infirm, because the historical lack of minor or independent party strength ratified Congress'
refusal to fund any presently popular candidate who had not demonstrated strength in a
past election. Given this structure, it is clear that the FECA strongly reinforces the politi-
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nificance, given its failure to further the purposes for which it was
attached and the strong prediction that the program would remain
even if the condition was severed.
D. Coerciveness of the Program
The fourth inquiry in the four-part framework explores the
"voluntariness" justification for allowing indirect pressure to be
placed upon constitutional rights. More specifically, this analysis
seeks to determine whether presidential candidates are faced with
a coercive threat to waive their constitutional rights or whether
they are given a value-enhancing financing alternative. Furthermore, even if the subsidy program and its attendant restrictions
pass the "voluntariness" test and are found to constitute a noncoercive offer, there may be systemic reasons why a court should
refuse to enforce the waiver. In this analysis, then, there are two
core issues: 1) the nature of the "offer," and 2) the possiblity that
regardless of the voluntariness of the waiver, it should not be enforced by a court.
1. Nature of the Offer
The argument that the condition involved in the Federal
Election Campaign Act is merely an offer of an additional financing alternative is centered on the theory that a candidate has no
right to complain about the expenditure limits that accompany the
receipt of public financing. The argument in defense of the condition can be categorized as follows: a) because public campaign
financing enhances a candidate's ability to speak, the candidate
cannot complain about the accompanying expenditure limits, and
b) because of the FECA, the candidate now has a choice between
two sources of funds where before he had only one. These arguments leave room for substantial response.

cal status quo. Republicans and Democrats will constantly be eligible for full public financ-

ing while small or new parties will be forced to spend much of their time and resources
fund-raising rather than campaigning, thus making it even more unlikely that these smaller
parties will ever be able to compete with the two major parties. This situation creates

strong financial incentives for a candidate to associate with a major party. In effect, then,
the Act appears to penalize candidates for exercising their constitutionally protected right
to associate with a minor party. Indeed, it would seem that "the fact that there have been

few drastic realignments in our basic two-party structure in 200 years is no constitutional
justification for freezing the status quo of the present major parties at the expense of such
future political movements." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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a. Candidate Benefits on the Whole
The first argument, that the Act increases the candidate's
ability to speak, reveals a startling insensitivity to first amendment
guarantees. Of course the provision for public financing enhances
speech, but the expenditure limits also restrict speech. The fact
that public financing serves a useful function is wholly irrelevant
to the issues raised by the suppression of political communication.
That government does good with one hand in no way justifies its
doing harm with the other. It is now clear that the recipient of a
government benefit need not accept "the bitter with the sweet." '52
This first argument suffers further from its sheer breadth, as
an example demonstrates. Oregon law provides that the state must
publish pamphlets describing the candidates for certain offices.15a
Under the first argument, this enhancement of a candidate's communication with the public could be conditioned upon the candidate's waiver of his right to mail additional literature to voters.
Likewise, free television time which enhances a candidate's ability
to communicate with the voters, could be conditioned on the surrender of other first amendment rights, such as the right to give
political speeches on public street corners. The natural temptation
is to respond to these examples by arguing that the conditions imposed in them are not particularly germane to the provision which
enhances speech; but neither is the condition imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act. The rejection of the "bitter with the
sweet" argument154 and the overbreadth of the first justification
suggest that candidates do retain their right to complain about
conditions attached to a benefit.
b. FECA Expands Financing Options
The second argument, that the Act constitutes a value-enhancing offer, is more substantial. In fact, a federal district court
held in 1980, in a decision summarily affirmed by the Supreme
Court, that it had "no difficulty"' 155 concluding that the imposition
152. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected
Rehnquist's plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1973), where it
had been stated that welfare claimants must "take the bitter with the sweet," by accepting
whatever due process limitations are found in the statute conferring the benefit.
153. OR. REv. STAT., §§ 251.005-.175 (1986).
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284
(S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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of conditions on the receipt of federal subsidies was within Congress' power "as long as the candidate remains free to engage in
unlimited private funding and spending instead of limited public
spending ....-1"M As long as the FECA gave the candidate this
option, it would not violate the first amendment rights of the candidate.1 57 If a candidate's decision to accept federal campaign financing and its attendant restrictions on political communication
is not voluntary, however, then the existence of the option is
meaningless and the financial grant must be viewed as an effort by
the government to induce the candidate to surrender his or her
constitutional rights. As such, it is no different from direct criminal or legal sanctions.158
A crucially important factor in assessing the Act's constitutionality, then, is the element of voluntariness. The first question
that arises is what is meant by involuntariness. Certainly, involuntariness requires less than a threat of "your life or your constitutional right". For example, a statute prohibiting the exercise of a
constitutional right is not rendered valid simply because the fine
or penalty is small. 159 Similarly, the college professor in Perry v.
Sindermann60 had a valid claim that he was being unconstitutionally penalized for the exercise of a first amendment right when he
was fired, despite the fact that presumably numerous other related
employment opportunities were available. So too, the welfare recipients in Shapiro v. Thompson161 did not have to prove imminent starvation as a motive for accepting welfare benefits when
they argued that their constitutional right to travel was being penalized by a state law requiring immigrants to be residents of such

156. Id.
157.

Id.

158. The Supreme Court recognized this argument in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 518 (1958)("To deny [a tax] exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of

speech is in effect to penalize them for this speech. Its deterrent effect is the same as if the
State were to fine them for this speech."). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
597 (1972)("[I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitu-

tionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be
penalized and inhibited."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("Governmental

imposition of such a choice [denying unemployment benefits to those who exercise their
freedom of religion] puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as

would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.").
159. A statute which imposes a fine upon persons who write articles criticizing the
government is no more constitutional because the fine is small than it is when the fine is
large.
160. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
161. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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state for one year before being eligible for welfare. All that must
be shown, therefore, is that some sort of penalty is being levied on
the exercise of a constitutional right which will pressure an individual's decision to exercise that right.1 62 What matters is not the
size of the penalty but its existence.
In the present case, the requisite level of involuntariness
might be provable. That public financing may be an attractive option to some presidential candidates is undisputable. With the imposition of $1,000 contribution limits in 1974,63 the ability of

candidates to raise funds has been significantly reduced. For some
candidates, then, the availablity of $29.4 million is a benefit, even
with its attendant restriction, because without such a program
they could not hope to raise that amount privately. 64 For these
candidates the decision is voluntary in the sense that there is no
risk of loss in choosing the public financing option. For other candidates, however, the decision is more difficult. This difficulty
arises in large part from the fact that the decision to reject federal
campaign financing must be made under circumstances of imperfect knowledge. To justify the funding of a campaign through private contributions, a candidate would need to raise: a) the amount
which would be available through public finacing; b) an additional
20 percent to cover the costs of private fundraising; and c) a further amount sufficient to fund significant additional campaign activities and to offset the fact that public financing is immediately
available in a lump sum whereas private money is raised over the
course of the full campaign. 165 Obviously, the decision by a particular candidate to rely on private financing in a particular cam-

162. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
[H]ere not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits
derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to
forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between
following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on
the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of
burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.
Id. at 404.
163. See supra notes 112 & '142 and accompanying text.
164. Even candidates in this category can argue powerfully that the government
should not be able to harm them with one hand while helping with the other. Strong support for this argument can be found in Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490 n.6 (1979). See
supra note 152 and accompanying text.
165. Joint Findings of Fact at 21, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election
Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.) (No. 79-1373), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
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paign carries a tremendous amount of risk, unless the candidate
were allowed to attempt it and, if unsuccessful, allowed to request
public financing. The FECA, however, requires that a candidate
applying for public financing certify that no contributions have
been accepted.1 6 Furthermore, the application and certification
must be filed within fourteen days of the candidate's nomination. 167 As a result, the presidential candidate must choose between the certainty of public financing and the uncertainties and
risks of the private route. Regardless of the consequences, the decision to accept private funds is irrevocable.
It should be emphasized again that this approach to the issue
of voluntariness turns not on what a candidate might accomplish
through private campaign financing, but on whether a candidate
will perceive a substantial risk in making that choice. It is certainly conceivable that there are candidates who are risk-averse
and will opt for public financing, although, in fact, they would
have been able to raise and spend more than that allowed under
the FECA. Thus, there is a chilling effect on political candidates'
free exercise of speech and upon their right to spend unlimited
amounts of money.
The district court in Republican National Committee v. Federal Election Commission'6 8 sought to escape the conclusion of
involuntariness suggested by the above argument by attacking the
premise that there is a significant amount of risk present in the
decision to choose private financing. The amount of money that
could be raised privately, the court argued, could be predicted
with reasonable accuracy on the basis of the candidate's ability to
raise money during the primary season. 69 This argument does not
merit support. This is evidenced by the same court's response
when it was confronted by the Reagan campaign officials' claim
that in light of their difficulties raising funds during the primary
season they would have had no choice in 1976 but to choose public
financing if Reagan had secured the nomination. 70 The court asserted that using Reagan's ability to raise money during the
primaries as a basis for predicting his later fundraising capacity
166.

26 U.S.C. § 9003(b)(2) (1986).

167.

11 C.F.R. § 9003.2(d) (1987).

168.

487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).

169. Id. at 300 ("The risk of taking private funding only to discover that an amount
exceeding the public grant cannot be raised is a great one, but it is a risk that can be

measured on the basis of the candidate's fund-raising experience during the primaries.").
170. Id. at 299-300.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:97

would be nonsensical, since he was then challenging an incumbent
President for his party's nomination."" The Court never recognized that this point undermines its earlier proposition that such a
period offered a sufficiently reliable basis from which to make a
risk-free prediction of future fundraising abilities.
This example highlights several additional problems with the
court's proposition. First, while the court's reasoning may be valid
when the party's nominee faces no opposition in the primaries, it
disregards the effect that the presence of other candidates in the
primaries have on raising money. If there are other candidates
battling for a given party's nomination, it is difficult for the ultimate nominee to predict how much his or her fundraising ability
will be enhanced by the lack of intra-party competition for money.
Second, if a candidate wanted to predict his ability to raise money
during the election, then a candidate would surely want to know
not only his own record during the primaries, but also the strength
and viability of the opposition candidate. The stronger the opposition, and hence the less likely "Candidate X" will win, the less
likely it is that "X" will be able to raise much money." 2 Professor
Joel Fleischman, who has done extensive research in the area of
campaign financing, has written: "The amount of money a candidate can raise for an election is

. .

.a reflection of potential sup-

port. It is a direct function of perceived political promise. Likely
winners can raise more money than likely losers."' 73 At the time
"Candidate X" has to choose between public and private financing, he may not have sufficient data to determine whether he is a
"likely winner" or a "likely loser."
The court's argument may be further criticized on a third
ground. In presidential elections the GOP and Democratic party
nominations are not made on the same date. Thus, the FECA's
requirement that the decision to choose public financing be made
and certified within fourteen days of the candidate's nomination
leads to the absurd result that "Candidate X," if nominated first,

171.

Id. at 300.

172. The relationship between the likelihood of ultimate victory, which necessitates
knowing the strengths of the opposition, is probably not linear. It seems that a candidate
engaged in a very intense struggle might well be able to solicit additional money. Nevertheless, it does appear likely that a candidate who is perceived to have a more remote chance
of being elected will be less likely to attract large sums of money than a candidate with a
more promising chance of victory.
173. Fleischman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of Political Opportunity: The
Constitutionalityof the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, 51 N.C.L. REv. 389, 459 (1973).
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will have to decide whether to accept public funding without yet
knowing the identity of his opponent. Without such knowledge,
"X" cannot predict accurately his future fundraising abilities. Yet
"X" is asked to make that very prediction, without the information necessary to make it accurately, and to then base a decision
involving his first amendment right to unlimited expenditures on
the figure so derived.
In effect, the candidate first nominated is placed in the classic
prisoner's dilemma. "Candidate X" may pursue private fundraising, in which case the amount "X" is able to raise will depend
upon the strength of the opposition. If the opposition is a strong
candidate, "X" may only raise ten million dollars, but if the opponent is a weak candidate, "X" may raise thirty million dollars.
The other option for "Candidate X" is to accept public financing,
in which case "X" receives twenty million dollars regardless of the
strength of the opposition. Assuming it is equally likely for the
opposition candidate to be weak or strong, "Candidate X" may be
compelled to accept public financing and its attendant restrictions,
despite the fact that if "X" could wait until after the nomination
of his opposition it is likely that "X" would forego public funding
if a weak candidate were nominated. An additional unfairness in
this situation is that the candidate nominated last is able to make
his or her decision regarding public financing without facing this
dilemma.
In addition to the above arguments, there is another argument that has been advanced to show that the waiver of a constitutional right in financing schemes such as that found in the
FECA is involuntary. This argument posits that the government
is, in effect, bribing candidates to forego their constitutional
rights. 17 4 By encouraging an individual not to exercise his or her
constitutional rights through the offer of large sums of money, the
goverment is said to be wrongfully pressuring the exercise of that
right. In essence, the offer is too good to refuse. This is the principal argument advanced by the Republican National Committee in
its suit against the Federal Election Commission." 5 In fact, it was
in responding to this argument that the court became confused.
When the Reagan officials claimed, that based on their primary
experience, they believed they could not raise more than twenty

174.

Plaintiff's Brief at 31, Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,

487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.)(No. 79-3073), arid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
175. Id. at 33.
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million dollars, the court did not respond by asking them why they
were complaining if the program had increased their ability to
campaign. Instead, the court made the point that the Republican
National Committee should have made; which was that the primary period is not a sound basis for predicting future fundraising
abilities." 6
Nevertheless, it would seem that the Republican National
Committee should have argued not the undisputable attractiveness
of public financing to some candidates,' 7 7 but that there are instances where public financing is not attractive but must nevertheless be accepted because of the previously discussed risks.' They
should also have argued that even if the candidates are in a better
position because of public financing, they should not be compelled
to accept the "bitter with the sweet." Thus, the coercive nature of
the FECA offer, as well as the decline of "the bitter with the
sweet" approach, buttress the constitutional doubts raised in part
79
one of the framework.
2.

Waivability of First Amendment Rights

An additional question which must be considered is whether

176. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 300
(S.D.N.Y.), affid, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) ("The ability of nominated presidential candidates
as opposed to primary candidates would be more relevant to the issue [of fundraising
ability].")
177. The danger with the irresistible attractiveness argument is that it muddies the
distinction between the pressuring or penalizing of constitutional rights, which is suspect,
and the right of the government to encourage alternative behavior.
178. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
179. A third possible argument that can be marshalled in favor of the argument that
participation in the program is not completely voluntary is that even if the structure of the
Act itself does not pressure candidates to choose public financing, there does exist political
pressure to choose public financing. The extent of this effect needs further documentation
before it can be accepted, but there are signs that political pressure is a factor in choosing
public financing. For example, President Reagan was concerned in 1984 about generating
negative publicity if he opted for private funding. The fear was that opportunistic opposition candidates would characterize his decision as evidence that he wanted to buy the election or was the wealthy man's candidate. In a closely contested election, such a characterization could be fatal. The point here is not the truthfulness of the characterization but that
the existence of public financing and its attendant restrictions provide an opportunity for
candidates to drive each other to waive their constitutional right to raise money privately
and to be free of spending limits. Given the FECA's rationale of eliminating undue reliance
on wealthy financiers, it may well be arguable that the Act implicitly stigmatizes those who
opt for private financing. It is not clear that government should be managing a program
that places such stigmas and political pressures on candidates who seek to exercise their
constitutional rights.
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a candidate should ever be allowed to waive his or her constitutional right to spend unlimited private funds. At first look, an affirmative answer appears justified. If a candidate or any individual
believes it is beneficial to sell his or her constitutional rights, it
would seem that his decision should be respected. It would also
seem that "if the constitutional right involved is designed to secure an area of autonomy for the citizen against the state, then
the exercise or nonexercise within that area should be left to the
citizen."' 80 To deny the citizen the right to waive a right may
limit rather than expand the citizen's valuation of the right. 8 '
Despite the above argument, there are particular rights that
the state will not allow an individual to waive, even if done voluntarily.182 The reason for this is that some constitutional guarantees
not only protect or preserve individual rights, but also further
other goals. 8 3 In these situations, it is sensible not to allow the
individual to decide the value of the right in question. The argument in support of the power to restrict the waiver of constitutional rights seems most powerful, then, in the context of rights
that define the structure of the government or the structure of a
decent society.' 8 4 Examples of such rights include the rights preserved by the eighth and thirteenth amendments, which were
designed to help structure a more decent society by prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment and the practice of slavery. 85
Judge Frank Easterbrook has been sharply critical of this
view that some or perhaps all constitutional rights should not be
waivable.'8s It is undeniable, as Easterbrook argues, that constitutional rights are in fact waived every day, many of them related to
the first amendment. 87 There may, however, still be grounds for

180. Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1383.
181. Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 347 ("A right that cannot be sold is worth less
than an otherwise identical right that may be sold.").
182. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (191 1)(thirteenth amendment

rights prohibiting involuntary servitude cannot be waived).
183. This notion that rights which serve societal goals cannot be waived is evidenced
by the refusal of the courts to recognize a litigant's waiver of subject matter jurisdiction,

whereas personal jurisdiction which "recognize[s] and protects an individual liberty interest" can be waived. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Companie des Bauxites de

Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982).
184.

Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1387-89.

185. See supranote 182. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)(limiting, on
eighth amendment grounds, the amount of time a prisoner could spend in an Arkansas

unreconstructed prison farm).
186.
187.

Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 346.
Id.
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concern. Though Easterbrook may argue that "there is nothing
special about the First Amendment "' 188 to justify restricting its
waivability, that view is not shared by everyone. 89
As was noted above, the argument for a restriction of the
power to waive a right is most powerful when the right affected
defines the structure of society and government.1 90 Therefore, perhaps certain categories of speech that affect the structure of government should not be waivable. Support for such an approach
can be found in the views of Justice Cardozo, who believed that
free speech was "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other freedom."19'1 It has also been said that if this is true of
speech in general, "free political speech is its crown and guarantor." '92 Indeed, Alexander Meiklejohn has urged that "First
Amendment rights constitute the quintessence of a democratic
self-government and that the people have reserved to themselves
absolute freedom in their exercise and have forbidden their government to intrude in any way on that free exercise." 93 Free
speech represents the means by which individuals singly and collectively shape, influence, and check their government. It is the
means by which truth may be determined. Clearly, the benefits of
free speech are much greater than self-autonomy and fulfillment.
For example, a debate between presidential candidates affords
benefits beyond the candidate's feeling of self-autonomy and fulfillment. Listeners also benefit. If the only benefits of the first
amendment were those secured by the speaker, then the concern
over the waiver of such rights would be less warranted. But that is
not the case. Depending upon the nature of the speech involved,
the externalities to society of an individual's exercise of his or her
right to speak freely may range from the minimal to the highly
significant. Political speech generated during a presidential campaign is surely of the type that yields important systemic benefits.
For that is how society determines who its leaders will be and the
type of government it desires. It is for that reason that the Supreme Court has stated that the "First Amendment has its fullest

188. Id.
189. See R. DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 395-97 (1985)(first amendment
rights should not be waivable since doing so would infringe upon the rights of listeners).
190. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
191. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
192. Fleischman, supra note 173, at 409.
193. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH & ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 255-56
(1948).
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and most urgent 1application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns
94
for public office." 1
To call for a ruling from the Supreme Court that the right to
speak freely cannot ever be waived, however, is unlikely to be
fruitful. A major flaw in the argument for such a rule is its overbreadth. In some situations, the government must be allowed to
extract a waiver of first amendment rights. For example, in the
public employment context it is sometimes necessary for the government to extract from its employees a waiver of the right to
disseminate certain information acquired on the job.195 In this situation, the employees' exercise of their rights would be costly for
the government. Thus, if the government could not extract such a
waiver, it is conceivable that the government would choose not to
hire the applicant. The argument that first amendment rights
should always be waivable, however, is also overbroad. At some
point, there must be alarm at the ability of a government to
purchase silence.' 96
Even Judge Easterbrook countenances that difficulties and inefficiencies arise when one of the parties to the waiver, such as the
government, holds monopoly power, or when externalities are generated by the exercise of the right. 197 In cases where there are
monopolies and externalities, private deals may lead to suboptimal
social results. This fundamental notion applies not only to the
waiver of certain constitutional rights, but to other transactions as
well. 198 A case may be built, then, for restricting the waiver of
free speech on just these grounds. The case is strongest where the
monopoly position is most imposing and the externalities are largest as in the case of wholesale restrictions of political speech by

194. Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271-72 (1971).
195. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980)(per curiam)(Snepp, a
former CIA official, was not allowed to publish the book Decent Interval without prior

clearance. The book was critical of the CIA's activities during the Vietnam War.).
196. The extent to which the government may extract waivers of first amendment
rights from government employees is explored in Part III of this article.
197. Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 349. For other arguments in favor of limiting the

government's ability to extract waivers when it holds a monopoly position with respect to
the activity or service involved, see Smolla, The Re-emergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinction in Constitutional Law: The Price of ProtestingToo Much, 35 STAN. L. REV. 69,
116 (1982); Terrell, "Property," "Due Process," and the Distinction Between Definition
and Theory in Legal Analysis, 70 GEo. L.J. 861, 901-03 (1982).

198. Pollution regulations and permit requirements, for example, may be seen as an
attempt to make polluters internalize the cost of the harms caused by their pollution. A.
FREEMAN, R. HAVEMANN, & A. KNEASE, THE EcONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY

(1983).
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the government.
In the case of the FECA, however, it is not so clear how
much the public loses because of the restriction of campaign expenditures beyond the $20 million-plus amount. Certainly there is
some loss. On the other hand, the government has not purchased
total silence because more than $20 million is still being spent on
political speech, which is not an insignificant amount. Furthermore, the government is not an absolute monopolist since there
are many other sources of money available to the candidates. As
more and more restrictions are placed on the legal size of campaign contributions, however, the amount of money that may be
raised in the private sector is becoming more limited and the monopoly power of the government is increasing.
3. Direction of the Fourth Factor:
Waivability

Involuntariness and

This fourth part in the four-part framework obviously raises
strong questions about FECA's constitutionality, as did the three
previous components of the framework. The argument that the
public financing program is not nearly so voluntary as it first appears is a powerful one. Indeed, the elements of risk, political
pressure, and timing place some candidates in a prisoner's dilemma where they may be compelled to accept public financing
and its restrictions on free speech. If the waiver should be found
voluntary, however, it is not clear that a court would invalidate
the waiver on the ground that the systemic benefits in political
speech which flow from the exercise of that constitutional right
cause it to be a right which cannot be waived.
4. Proposed Congressional Amendments
Before concluding this analysis of the constitutionality of the
Federal Election Campaign Act, it is worth noting that Congress
is currently contemplating various measures which would greatly
expand its scope. The most significant bill in the 100th Congress
was, undoubtedly, the so-called Boren proposal.' 99 Initially, the
bill featured public funding for Senate general election candidates
who agreed to spending limits on their primary and general election campaigns. In an effort to reduce the cost of the proposal,
199.
1987).

S.2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2, 133 CONG. REc. S109-13 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
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however, the bill was amended to provide public funding only to a
candidate whose opponent exceeds spending limits.200
If the original version of the FECA raised substantial constitutional questions, the current version of the Boren proposal,
which would amend the FECA, sends off constitutional alarms
that are deafening. It is evident that Congress is pursuing an end
explicitly rejected in Buckley, that of limiting the expenditures of
political candidates. For example, under the current version of the
Boren proposal, a candidate who does not participate in the public
financing program would be ineligible for preferential postal and
broadcast rates which are significantly lower than the current
rates. Also, such candidates must place a disclaimer on political
advertisements, stating that they do not abide by expenditure limits. 20 ' The purpose of the disclaimer is clearly to increase the political pressure on candidates to participate in the program. The
disclaimer should be reworded, however, to read: This candidate
has refused to yield to unconstitutional congressional pressure and
has not abandoned her first amendment rights.
If the defenders of the FECA provisions analyzed previously
could attempt to argue that the government was not seeking to
penalize candidates for exercising their first amendment rights,
such an argument would be futile under these amendments. Candidates who refuse to abide by expenditure limits are penalized by
being denied public funds, losing cost-reducing benefits, and having to place disclaimers on their advertisements. Such substantial
penalties would certainly coerce all future candidates into participating in the program that requires the waiver of their first
amendment rights, without advancing the alleged purposes behind
the FECA any more than the original Act did. A coerced waiver
appears to be exactly what Congress intends, and this is an unconstitutional purpose.
E. Conclusion on the FECA's Constitutionality
The four-part framework for analyzing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions indicates that the FECA requirement that
candidates waive their first amendment right to raise and spend
an unlimited amount of private funds is unconstitutional. First,
the condition is not germane to the three governmental interests
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
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underlying the provision of funds. Indeed, the condition does not
further any legitimate governmental interest. Second, the candidates who do and those who do not agree to comply with the condition are similarly situated with respect to the alleged purposes
for the condition. Third, the government could be predicted to
continue the program even if the waiver condition was invalidated,
unless an unconstitutional motivation such as a desire to accomplish indirectly what cannot be accomplished directly underlies
the program's existence. At the same time, participation in the
FECA program is not entirely voluntary, and it pressures the candidates' first amendment rights as they are coerced into participating in a program which requires that those rights be relinquished. Those who resist the program and the waiver are
penalized. 2 Finally, the waiver condition not only fails to further
any legitimate governmental interests, but it actually appears to
undermine certain governmental interests, and all at the price of
the candidate's first amendment rights.
III.

CONDITIONING PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to
the waivers often attached to public employment is nothing
new.20 3 The conditioning of public employment is an issue which
confronts every administration upon assuming office, but it has become a subject of increasing importance in light of the Reagan
Administration's pronounced efforts to condition public employment on the waiver of first amendment rights. 4 Part A of this
section explores the Reagan Administration's attempt to make
widespread use of prepublication review programs and secrecy
agreements. The focus in Part B is on other types of public employment conditions.
A. Prepublication Review
After taking office, the Reagan Administration sharply curtailed the first amendment rights of government employees. In
1981, the "Administration apparently broadened the categories of
202. The only variable of the framework that does not strongly indicate that the
condition is unconstitutional is the status quo analysis. As noted earlier, however, this will
always be the case when a condition is attached to a new benefit. See supra notes 63-64
and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 31-38.
204. See infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text.
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employees to whom a lifelong censorship requirement applied."20 5
By 1983, twelve government agencies, including the Department

of Education, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the Peace
Corps, all required prepublication review of all employees' speech

regardless of whether they had access to classified information.20 6
In 1984, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 84 (NSDD-84) 20 7 which "found unlawful disclosures of
properly classified information" to be a "matter of grave concern." 208 The directive 2 9 sought to require nondisclosure agreements from all employees with access to classified information,
and the agreement provided for widespread prepublication review. 210 Specifically, NSDD-84 required that all employees agree,
as consideration for being employed by the government, to submit

for review all written materials, including fiction, which touched
or purported to touch upon classified information. This obligation
would continue for life, unless a release was issued.21 ' If NSDD84 had been fully implemented, it would have affected approximately 2.5 million government and 1.5 million contractor employees. 212 Because of widespread criticism, however, the Administra-

tion suspended, but did not revoke, NSDD-84. 13 Since the
suspension of NSDD-84, however, the Reagan Admistration has
promulgated "Classified Information Nondisclosure Form 189,"
205. Comment, The Constitutionalityof Expanding PrepublicationReview of Government Employee's Speech, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 962 (1984).
206. Id.
207. National Security Decision Directive 84 - SafeguardingNational Security Information: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 85-86 (1984), reprinted in 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1759-60 (1983)[hereinafter Senate Hearings].
208. Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 85, reprinted in 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
at 1759.
209. For a thorough summary of the Directive and a wide-ranging critique, see Comment, supra note 205.
210. Senate Hearings, supra note 207, at 85, reprintedin 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
at 1759 ("All persons with authorized access to Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI) shall be required to sign a non-disclosure agreement . . . . All such agreements
must include a provision for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other
classified information.").
211. Review of the President'sNational Security Decision Directive 84 and the Proposed Department of Defense Directive on Polygraph Use: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1984) [hereinafter House Hearings] (Statement of Kenneth J.
Coffey, Associate Director, U.S. GAO).
212. Whistleblower Might Lose Security Clearance, Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1987,
§1, at 20.
213. See Retreatfrom Secrecy Madness, N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1984, at A26, col. 1.
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and more than 1.5 million federal employees have had to sign
14
it.2
Although the prepublication review program and other similar requirements have been criticized on a variety of different
grounds,215 it has been observed that "they may also be attacked
as an unconstitutional condition on employment." ' Thus, the following section of this Article applies the four-part framework developed in Part I to the issues raised by government prepublication reviews. This is done not.only to test the constitutionality of
this specific program, but also to provide insight into the permissible scope of further government efforts to restrict the speech of
government employees.
1. Germaneness of Condition
For an employment condition to be constitutional, it must
protect an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech. 1 7 The germaneness analysis explores this
very requirement. Two legitimate government interests may explain the government's interest in a prepublication or nondisclosure program. The first interest is national security, and the second encompasses traditional employer-related interests.
There can be no argument that national security is a substantial government interest. The assertion of that interest alone is not
enough, however, to justify restricting an employee's first amendment rights. As one court has observed, "[t]he line between information threatening to foreign policy and matters of legitimate
public concern is often very fine." '18 Thus, there must be a deter-

214. Comment, supra note 205, at 970-71.
215. See Cheh, Symposium" National Security and Civil Liberties:Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 690
(1984); Note, Politics and the Non-Civil Service Public Employee: A Categorical Approach to First Amendment Protection, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 558 (1985); Comment, supra
note 205.
216. Comment, supra note 205, at 999.
217. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) (Regulations which prohibited the
circulation of petitions challenging Air Force grooming standards were found to protect a
substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and were
thus upheld.). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (Department of
Corrections regulations authorizing the screening of inmate mail declared invalid because
they did not further an important governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of
expression.).
218. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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mination that there is a national security problem to be remedied,
followed by a determination that the condition involved promotes
such a remedy. One problem with this analysis is that the extent
to which such prepublication review is needed is not immediately
clear. As one commentator has noted,21 9 the unauthorized disclosure of classified information already constitutes a violation of various criminal provisions of the U.S. Code.2 '
Assuming that there is a national security problem, although
this has been disputed,22l it does not appear that such nondisclosure and prepublication programs will prevent unauthorized disclosures. In fact, the programs are most ineffective where they are
most needed, that being when classified information is intentionally disclosed. "Prepublication review, as with any prior restraint,
can only be directed at 'innocent' or 'inadvertent' disclosures. 222
Thus, the condition is most effective where the risk of substantial
harm is the slightest, that being when confidential information is
inadvertently disclosed. It is virtually inconceivable that a government employee with access to classified information would inadvertently make such a grievous disclosure, given the screening and
training such employees undergo before receiving security clearance. Nevertheless, every employee having access to classified information would have to seek preclearance review before publishing any material relating to the government. In some departments
where there is no access to classified information, employees are
still required to submit to preclearance review. This seems particularly suspect given the strong statement in McGehee v. Casey
that "[t]he government
has no legitimate interest in censoring un' 23
materials."
classified
Despite the serious problems regarding the programs' inefficiency, it is difficult to argue that a preclearance program of any
sort is not germane at all to the pursuit of national security. Given
the ease of characterizing any government program that reduces
the free flow of speech as aimed at improving national security,
however, it would seem that it is especially necessary to scrutinize

219. Comment, supra note 205, at 967.
220. See, e.g., Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794, 798 (1986).
221.

In 1983, the GAO reported to Congress that in the previous five years there

were only 21 unauthorized disclosures made in writings or speeches of current or former
employees, of which two would have been covered by the proposed review program. Com-

ment, supra note 205, at 966.
222.
223.

Id. at 984.
McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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the means-end fit. The looser the fit, the more concern there
should be that the infringement of the free speech of government
employees is motivated by other non-security factors. Indeed, the
notion that the goal of prepublication review is aimed at something not so benign as national security has already been suggested.2 24 Some critics of Nondisclosure Form 189 have maintained that it is designed to have a chilling effect on
whistleblowers who reveal spending excesses and cost overruns.2 2 5
This concern is bolstered by evidence that the Reagan Administration has developed a "carefully conceived and comprehensive
plan to censor virtually all types of government information." 22 6 A
few of the specific acts of the Administration that are said to constitute such a plan include the denial of visas to controversial foreign speakers, a restriction of the information that may be acquired under the Freedom of Information Act, the revision of
classification procedures to expand the amount of information that
may be classified, and restriction of the screening of films that
cover controversial issues.22
The apparent inability of the preclearance program to significantly further national security interests suggests that the condition is not particularly germane to the interest in national security. This concern is reinforced by the perception that the
Administration has deliberately and systematically attempted to
reduce the flow of all types of general information. The air of secrecy that has characterized the Reagan Adminstration's tenure
could well be seen as having been sought for domestic political
reasons rather than for the preservation or enhancement of the
nation's security.
As was noted at the outset of this discussion, however, there
is a second explanation that may justify the program. This explanation concerns the government's interests as an employer and the
government's desire to avoid a situation in which individual em-

224. See Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25,
1983, §6 (Magazine), at 22. Also, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
produced a list of 30 acts of the Reagan Administration that indicated the existence of a
systematic effort to curtail the flow of information, see House Hearings,supra note 211, at
467-69 (prepared statement of Jack Landau, Executive Director of Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press).
225. Whistleblower Might Lose Security Clearance, Chicago Tribune, July 4, 1987,

§ 1, at 20.
226. House Hearings, supra note 211, at 455 (prepared statement of Jack Landau,
Executive Director of Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press).
227. Id. at 467-69.
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ployees have the ability to sabotage proposed programs by prematurely releasing them for public debate.
That the government has some legitimate interests as an employer is clear.2 28 For example, the government as an employer
has a legitimate interest in assuring the maintenance of its regular
operations and the staffing of its positions with employees who
properly perform their regular duties.2 2 9 This cannot, however, be
used as a basis for silencing employee criticisms. The Supreme
Court supported this position when it ruled that a teacher could
not be dismissed for writing letters to a newspaper critical of a
school board's true motives for raising additional revenues, because such statements, although erroneous, did not "interfere with
-23
the regular operation of the schools ...
Furthermore, even if this second justification for the program
is correct, it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why employees need to be bound by a preclearance program after they
have left the government. This highlights the importance of determining the actual motivation behind the program. If the purpose
is national security, as apparently was the case in in Snepp v.
United States, 31 then the need to maintain a preclearance program even after the employee has left the CIA is significantly
stronger than if the purpose were to promote efficient government
operations. To require the CIA to pursue traditional tortious or
criminal remedies after Snepp publishes information "would subject the CIA and its officals to probing discovery into the Agency's
highly confidential affairs. Rarely would the Government run this
2 32
risk."
These concerns would appear to carry much less weight, however, when the programs limiting speech are allegedly justified by
the need for promoting efficient government operations. In fact,
employee speech on government policies and operations which
does not relate to national security would seem to be deserving of
special first amendment protection. "The public interest in having
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance-the

228. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)(There must be a balance between the teacher's interests, as a citizen and "the interest of the state, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees.").
229. Id. at 572-73.
230. Id. at 573.
231. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
232. Id. at 514-15.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:97

core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment [is
a great one] ..

."33

This is not to say, however, that employees

who engage in policymaking or who speak on behalf of the government do not need to maintain a certain uniformity with government policies, particularly with regard to the release of information which could sabotage a proposed program."3 4 It remains
important to note, however, that a preclearance program which
chills or infringes speech that is unrelated to national security concerns or the government's interest as an employer is not
germane.23 5
That the Reagan Administration's primary motive for proposing the program may not have been its interests as an employer
can be inferred from the fact that the program applied primarily
to those who have access to classified information.23 6 More critically, to the extent the Administration was attempting to stifle
dissent, debate, and the flow of information on matters beyond
those where the government's legitimate need for uniformity
among its employees is present, it represented an infringement
upon democratic values and the imposition of an employment condition not germane to legitimate government interests.
2. Applying the Condition:

Similarly Situated Parties?

This second inquiry of the four-part framework explores the
extent to which individuals who do and do not comply with the
government's requirement are situated similarly. This is accomplished by focusing on the purposes of the prepublication program.
As was noted earlier, 37 two general purposes underlie the estab-

233. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968).
234. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Coven, The First Amendment Rights of
Policy Making Public Employees, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 559, 568 (1977).
235. These restrictions will deter or chill the speech of employees who would leak,
for attribution, politically embarassing information or material which is critical of a supervisor. Employees who leak information on a "not for attribution," basis, however, are unlikely to feel constrained by non-disclosure agreements and pre-publication requirements.
Such chilling is justifiable only to the extent it affects the two previously identified legitimate government interests: 1) national security, and 2) traditional government as an employer in assuring the efficiency of the office.
236. Twelve agencies, however, developed preclearance requirements even though
they do not handle national security-related information. Such agencies include the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Department of Education, and the Federal Reserve Department. These review requirements result from each agency's internal policies and apply only
for the employer's term of employment. Comment, supra note 205.
237. See supra text accompanying note 217.
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lishment of a prepublication review program: 1) concern for national security, and 2) employer concerns that traditional government functions not be disrupted and that government employees
be able to perform their duties properly.
With respect to the government interest in national security,
there does seem to be a significant difference between the situations of those who do and do not comply with the requirement.
Extracting waivers of first amendment rights from employees involved with national security matters is not likely to be done out
of a desire to penalize such workers for exercising their constitutional right to free speech. Employees who are willing to agree not
to disclose confidential matters affecting national security are obviously situated very differently from individuals who reserve the
right to disclose such matters. Denying jobs that deal with national security to those who may compromise that security furthers legitimate government interests. Thus, the granting of jobs
to those who will abide by the requirements can be seen as a selective benefit conferred upon those willing to make the sacrifice.
On the other hand, with respect to the government's interests
in national security, individuals who do not have access to classified information and do waive their first amendment rights are not
situated differently from such individuals who refuse to waive
their first amendment rights. Thus, the thousands of government
employees who are currently required to submit to prepublication
reviews despite having no access to classified information would
appear to be the victims of a government penalty for preserving
their first amendment rights.23 8 Restricting their free speech does
not further any interest in national security.
Also, the earlier analysis under the germaneness of the condition variable suggests that the national security justifications asserted by the government should be viewed somewhat skeptically,
given: a) the evidence of an apparent Administration plan to reduce the flow of such critical and controversial information, b) the
inefficiency of prepublication reviews with respect to enhancing security, and c) the availability of other government remedies to
deal with disclosures of classified information. 39 If the national
security interests alleged by the government are merely pretext,
then the prepublication review program would appear to be a penalty on all employees for exercising their constitutionally-pro-
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tected freedom of speech.
When the various prepublication review programs are compared with the government's interests as an employer, there is additional evidence of individuals being penalized for exercising
their constitutional rights. For instance, there would seem to be no
need to continue to apply such a requirement to individuals who
no longer work for the government. In fact, under this governmental interest, there would be no reason that the government should
treat former government employees any differently than individuals who never worked for the government. To do otherwise would
be to penalize such former employees without furthering the government's interests as an employer.
Regarding current employees, it is difficult to understand the
need for a preclearance program, especially one that affects more
than one million employees. It is not at all clear that, with respect
to the government's interest in its regular operations not being undermined and in its employees being able to perform their daily
duties, an employee who agrees to submit to prepublication review
is situated differently than one who does not. This is reinforced by
the fact that an employee may always be discharged if he makes
comments that interfere with the employer's regular operation of
the government or impede the individual's proper performance of
his job.240
3. Significance of the Government's Interests
The government's interest in conditioning public employment
on prepublication or secrecy agreements does not appear very significant, especially with respect to employees not intimately involved with matters of national security. Indeed, the requirement
of prepublication review, even if germane, does not significantly
further legitimate government interests in national security. Alternatives exist which would more directly further the government's
legitimate interest, while not trampling so indiscriminately on first
amendment interests.
Thus, the likely government reaction to the Court's striking
down of prepublication reviews and expansive secrecy agreements
would be to increase penalties and prosecutions of individuals who
make disclosures of classified information. This result would have
a number of advantages. First, it would affect only a handful of
240.
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employees, those who had actually disclosed protected information. Second, the likelihood of government harassment of employees who voice critical views would be substantially lessened. Third,
to the extent that unauthorized disclosures are a serious problem,
it is likely that the government would sharply reduce the number
of people who have access to classified information. The existence
of these workable alternatives lessens significantly the government's need for and reliance upon this prepublication review
program.
The need to focus on the extent of the government's interest
in conditioning employment is especially evident where it is conceivable that the employment conditions, at least in certain circumstances, are in fact germane to the government's interests in
national security. Rather than focus on the government's purposes
for imposing the condition, this inquiry focuses on the federal employment scheme as well as on the extent to which the first
amendment waiver condition furthers the government's interests.
Because the condition does not contribute significantly to legitimate interests and because it can be predicted that the government will continue to employ people in its absence, it is clear that
despite the appeal of the greater-includes-the-lesser theory, the
condition does constitute an expansion of the government's
intrusiveness.24
4.

Voluntariness of the Waiver

The fourth inquiry seeks to determine whether the government has made a value-enhancing offer with its imposition of a
condition on a government benefit. In the context of conditions
imposed on current employees, however, this inquiry does not
prompt the detailed analysis it did when applied to a new government benefit provided with limiting conditions.
To the extent that the proposed preclearance requirement or
current nondisclosure agreement is enforceable against current
employees, the program cannot be considered an offer. The government's contention that agreement to the terms of the program
constitutes consideration for the opportunity to work in particular
positions of trust is flawed. These employees have already contracted to do the work. The government's subsequent effort to extract additional consideration then bears a resemblance to tradi241.

Kreimer, supra note 8, at 1374-75.
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tional contractual notions of duress where one party threatens to
breach a contract unless it is modified.2 42 Though the analogy to
the law of contracts is not perfect,243 it does help suggest that the
imposition of such a program would not expand an employee's
range of employment options. In fact, the requirement of
preclearance operates as a threat to current employees--comply
or else.
The offer/threat analysis is more helpful in the context of
new job applicants. 24" The argument here is that the new employee voluntarily waived his or her first amendment rights, and
that the decision should be respected. This notion appears to lie at
the heart of the Snepp opinion. The Court noted that Snepp had
"explicitly recognized that he was entering a trust relationship"
which "imposed the obligation not to publish . . . without submit-

ting the information for clearance. "245 However, there are
problems with this argument. First, it allows the government to
extract outrageous concessions, as long as the employee agrees.
Arguably, the government could ask its employees to waive their
right to vote for the candidate of their choice or to freely practice
the religion of their faith. The Supreme Court long ago recognized, however, that the Bill of Rights protects employees from
such requests. Thus, the Court accepted the argument that Congress "may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican,
Jew, or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' ",246 "None would deny such limitations on congressional power. 2 47 Nevertheless, as long as the employee agreed,
the waiver argument would appear to tolerate the employee's right
to make that choice.
A second problem with the waiver argument is that special
concerns may be raised when the government extracts waivers of
the right of free speech. Systemic interests could be greatly af-

242. Austin Instrument Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 130, 272 N.E.2d 533,
535, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22, 25 (1971).
243. It is not clear that irreparable injury will result if the employees did not agree
to the government's terms. Furthermore, many government employees do not have term

employment contracts.
244. This argument could be expanded if one viewed current government employees
as terminable at will. If this is the case, then current employees could be seen as being in
the same position with respect to their rights as a new job applicant.
245. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-11 (1980).
246. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946).
247. Id.
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fected if the government can extract such waivers.24 It is clear
that the shape and control of government is greatly influenced and
checked by the unfettered exchange of speech.2 4 9 To allow the
government to extract waivers from millions of individuals who
are in a position to know the most about the government's operations, would be to allow a significant distortion of public debate.
While expression of views favorable to current policies or personnel may be overlooked by those charged with maintaining the
agreements, those voicing critical views may not be treated so
kindly. In the analogous situation found in Pickering,20 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of allowing teachers to
speak out on school issues.
Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such
questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal. 51
The "checking value" provides additional support for this argument. "Since under the checking value information about the conduct of government is accorded the highest possible valuation,
speech critical of public officials by those persons in the best position to know what they are talking about-namely, government
employees-would seem to deserve special protection." 252
A third argument against the validity of a waiver is that the
courts may not be willing to treat a condition that is explicitly
provided as a term in an employment contract differently from a
condition that is embodied in a general rule. In McGehee,z5 " the
Court observed that "it makes no difference to our analysis
whether the government seeks to restrict the speech rights of its
employees by individual contract or by a broad rule applicable to
a class of employees. Either way, the government may not impose
unconstitutional conditions on government employment."254 Although the condition was struck down, the Court's language may
248. It is unlikely that individual employees would value very highly their first
amendment rights, though in the aggregate, the effect of such waivers could be immense.
249. See supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text.
250. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
251. Id. at 572.
252. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
Ras. J. 521, 634.
253. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
254. Id. at 1141.
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lead future courts to decide that broad, conditional rules produce
voluntary waivers.
A fourth problem with the waiver argument is that an agreement between two parties may not be optimal if one party possesses monoply power. This may well describe the government's
position. If the preclearance program affects virtually all public
employees, as contrasted with the more limited program at issue
in Snepp,25 5 then such conditions "might be cause for substantial
concern" since "the government dominates a larger fraction of all
[employment] opportunities. 2 51 In such situations, the conditions
should "be treated as if they were coercive. 2' 5 7
The proposed prepublication review and nondisclosure agreements are especially troublesome because they undeniably restrict
the status quo for the 1.5 million employees affected. Any condition that is unilaterally imposed on current employees certainly
upsets expectations and restricts the range of the employee's free
expression. The similarity between the required relinquishment of
first amendment rights by current government employees and the
quintessential restriction of the status quo example is striking.2 58
The benchmark example of restriction concerns the recharacterization of a public forum into a more limited one, since "the limitation reduces the range of freedom of speech and assembly in
comparison to the freedom available before."2 59 Likewise, the imposition of first amendment restrictions on government employees
reduces the individual's range of speech in comparison to the freedom available before. At the same time, the government's power
is expanded. For the employee who is forced to accept the condition after her employment, the situation is particularly acute because she is being required to forego without compensation a right
she previously enjoyed.
5. Conditioning Public Employment:

Constitutional Restraints

The four-part framework for analyzing questions of unconstitutional conditions offers important insights into government efforts to restrict the first amendment rights of its employees. The
imposition of such conditions undeniably leaves the employees
255.
256.
257.
258.
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worse off with respect to their constitutional rights, and because
there is no significant justification for the government to do so, it
is difficult to understand why such restraints on the first amendment should be constitutional when they can not be directly imposed on the general citizenry.
While the Reagan Administration proposals appear to clearly
violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, that is not to
say that all efforts to impose prepublication reviews on government employees would fail a similar analysis. The Reagan proposals were constitutionally suspect primarily because of their sweep.
As has been seen, many government employees were subject to
the restraints despite the fact that including them did not significantly further either of the government's two asserted interests in
national security and traditional employer interests. Future administrations would be well advised to be more circumspect in
their imposition of constitutional conditions on government employees. Indeed, no employee should be asked to waive his or her
constitutional rights if it is not necessary to further significant legitimate government interests. This would suggest that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions would not find unconstitutional
a program that requires nondisclosure of information vital to national security. It would also appear that the doctrine requires the
government to pursue its interests with the means least intrusive
on first amendment rights. With respect to the government's interests as an employer, it is not clear that preclearance is ever
needed, with a possible exception for individuals who speak on behalf of the government. Employees who do undermine the government's interests as an employer can already be dismissed. Finally,
the availability of less intrusive means heightens the suspicion that
the government is seeking to penalize individuals who exercise
their first amendment rights. That is, it appears that the government is trying to do indirectly what it could not do directly. Government conditions on employment that are overbroad and which
fail to promote government interests to some extent should, therefore, be invalidated as unconstitutional conditions.
B.

Other Employment Conditions

Many cases involving the conditioning of a government benefit or employment on the waiver of a constitutional right will not
be so clearly suspect as the requirements seen in the FECA and
the prepublication review program. To demonstrate how the four
inquiries interact, as well as how such a framework affects current
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law, a few examples involving public employment conditions will
be scrutinized.
The first example analyzes how a case such as Connick v.
Myers26 would have fared if the Court had used the four-part
framework. In that case, an Assistant District Attorney, Myers,
distributed a questionnaire to co-workers that solicited their views
on employee morale and on the existence of pressure to participate
in political campaigns. As a result of this action, Myers was dismissed. After a federal district court and the Fifth Circuit Court
had agreed that Myers should be reinstated, the Supreme Court
reversed.
With respect to the questions concerning poor employee morale, the Supreme Court avoided rigorous scrutiny of the government's interests by concluding that such questions were not of
public import.261 In such instances, "absent the most unusual circumstances" a federal court should not review the wisdom of the
firing decision.262 The majority argued that to presume every criticism directed at a public official is of public concern would mean
that vitually every remark "would plant the seed of a constitutional case."2 6 In his dissent, Brennan was sharply critical of this
conception of what information is of public interest. "The First
Amendment protects the dissemination of such information so
that the people, not the courts, may evaluate its usefulness. 26 4
Rather than constrict the scope of information protected by the
first amendment, the Court should "require that adequate weight
be given to the public's important interests in the efficient performance of governmental functions and in preserving employee
discipline and harmony sufficient to that end."2 6 '
With respect to the question concerning pressure to participate in political campaigns, the majority conceded that the question raised a question of public interest.266 Nevertheless, the Court
held that the dismissal was constitutional. 67 The majority argued
that such a questionnaire interfered with working relationships,
and that the manner, time, and place in which the questionnaire

260.
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264.
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was distributed dictated that the questionnaire not be allowed.
More particularly, the majority noted that Myers exercised her
rights at the office, and that she distributed the questionnaire for
'
reasons not "of purely academic interest."268
Rather than redefining what information is of public interest
or providing "a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgement" 261 when "close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities,' ' 70 the courts should pursue a less deferential, more neutral analysis, particularly in cases where an
employee has criticized her employer. The first three inquiries of
the four-part framework provide guidance to the courts in undertaking such an analysis.
The first inquiry explores the germaneness of the condition.
That is, does the firing of an employee who distributes such a
questionnaire further any legitimate government interest. One legitimate interest that may be threatened by such employee behavior is the rule that employees are to be engaging in government
work during work hours, not pursuing personal interests. A second
governmental interest, related to the first, is that the office operate
efficiently and that its employees be able to efficiently execute
their responsibilities. In certain circumstances, the maintenance of
close working relationships is important. It is not obvious, however, that a questionnaire soliciting the views of others would disrupt employee relationships. The views actually elicited or expounded may poison relationships, but it is unclear that the
solicitation process itself causes such problems. Thus, denying the
distribution of a questionnaire clearly appears germane to certain
employer interests, but not so clearly to others.
The second inquiry focuses on how this condition applies to
Myers. The factual findings of the District Court are helpful here.
With respect to Myers' ability to perform her responsibilities, the
District Court found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that there
was not "any evidence" that the questionnaire impeded Myers'
execution of her responsiblities .1 7 Also, because the questionnaire
was distributed during lunchtime, Myers' work effort was not affected. Indeed, Myers violated no office policy. 272 Finally, the Dis-
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trict Court found that Myers' questionnaire did not have an adverse effect on Myers' relationship with her superiors. 73 The
Court's majority, however, ignored these findings and deferred to
the employer, whom the employee had criticized, for his description of the working relationship. Even then, the employer could
only state that he feared a subsequent disruption of the relationship. At the time of the dismissal there was no evidence of an
ineffective relationship. 74 Still further, there was no showing that
the effectiveness or efficiency of the office had been in any way
impeded by Myers' speech.
The third inquiry explores the significance of the government's interests in denying such speech. The interests in disallowing the circulation of Myers' questionnaire do not appear significant.2 7 5 Also, the likelihood that the government's motives for
censoring the speech are illegitimate may be inferred from the
contents of the questionnaire. In particular, an employer would
have strong reasons to prevent the flow of information to the public regarding the political pressure put on employees to participate
in campaigns or the poor morale of employees under the elected
district attorney. Indeed, the internal operations of that district
attorney's office had often been the subject of extensive critical
media coverage. 6
Because no attempt was made to justify the condition as an
element of a voluntary agreement entered into by the employer
and the employee, the fourth inquiry is not needed. Even if such a
justification were offered, it would carry little weight. Employees
should not have to bargain away constitutional rights when it does
not significantly further the government's legitimate interests.
Furthermore, unlike a situation where government officials working for the CIA are asked to waive their right to speak about matters of national security, the situation here is much more generalized, and can be applied to all government employees. Thus, the
government's monopoly position as employer is much stronger,
and the argument that the employee is enjoying a special benefit
as a reward for waiving the first amendment right is weaker.
273. Id. at 759
274. Brennan notes in his dissent that the Court has held previously that "fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression."
Connick, 461 U.S. at 169 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
275. See supra notes 271-74 and accompanying text.
276. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 160 n.2.
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A second example worth analyzing under the four-part test
proposed by this Article is a situation where an employee is fired
for making certain statements, but the four-part framework would
find the condition to be constitutional. An example might be the
dismissal of a school teacher who has made statements to the effect that black students are less intelligent than white students.
While it is clear that the government could not directly prohibit
such speech by citizens at large, the four-part framework would
indicate that a teacher who has voiced such views could be
stripped of his employment. The justification for this lies in the
relationship between the speech and the benefit withdrawn.
The first inquiry explores the germaneness of the requirement
that school teachers not express views which are critical of the
intelligence of a certain group of students. It is clear that such a
requirement furthers legitimate government interests. Teachers
who express such views certainly impede their functioning in the
classroom. Government has a legitimate interest in its teachers not
espousing views that demean a class of citizens, as these are views
that other government agents seek to combat. Furthermore, students who are black would likely resent being taught by such a
teacher, which would impede the educational process further.
There can be little question that the statements by the
teacher are the type of speech the school board would want to
prohibit. A requirement that teachers not hold or express views
which undermine their effectiveness in the classroom is germane.
Applying that requirement to the teacher who has made the racially derogatory remarks is legitimate. Such remarks undermine
the teacher's effectiveness. This situation should be contrasted
with that in Pickering, in which the teacher criticized the
school board. In that situation, there was no evidence that the
teacher's performance in the classroom was jeopardized' 78
The third inquiry's focus on the significance of the government's interests also supports the dismissal of the teacher. The
government's interests in education and staffing the schools with
people who can teach effectively is certainly significant. Requiring
teachers to not make statements that would jeopardize their effectiveness is similarly significant. Finally, it does not seem likely
that the teacher could complain that he or she was coerced into
the teaching profession.
277.
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A final case worth scrutinizing is one recently before the Supreme Court, Rankin v. McPherson. 9 In this case, a deputy constable had been fired from her position when she told a co-worker
after the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March
30, 1981: "[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him."28
After the district court upheld the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit
unanimously reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed but with only four votes for the Court's opinion. In making its analysis, the Court did not question the district court's conclusion that McPherson actually hoped that the President would
be assassinated. The government did not attempt to justify the
dismissal as being the result of evidence that future efficiency or
morale of the office was threatened. Rather, the goverment asserted that it should not have to employ anyone who "rides with
the cops and cheers for the robbers." 28'
The first inquiry of the four-part framework explores the germaneness of this requirement. It does seem that such a condition,
that employees in a constable's office not "cheer for the robbers, 2 82 is germane to legitimate government interests and the
agency should be entitled to employ only those individuals who
have no serious reservations about the fundamental mission of the
agency. Furthermore, it cannot be seriously questioned that such
an interest is significant - an important finding as seen in the
third inquiry.
The problem with the government's action, however, was application of the condition to McPherson, who was a routine clerk/
typist and possessed no law enforcement power. The second inquiry of the four-part framework makes clear that even if a condition is generally germane, it must be germane as applied. Here,
there was no evidence that McPherson's speech in any way impeded her ability to perform her responsibilities. Nor was there
any evidence that the office's functionings were jeopardized by the
speech.

Thus, McPherson's statement, though disturbing, was not a
justifiable basis for stripping her of her government employment.
Given that the government could not directly punish a citizen for
expressing views comparable to McPherson's, there is no justifica-

279.

Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987).

280. Id. at 2895.
281.
282.

McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

1988-89]

CONDITIONS

tion for finding a different result when the government indirectly
seeks such an end, absent a showing that such a condition is a
significant part of the program or employment.
While the courts have struggled in determining the constitutionality of restrictions on government employees' first amendment
rights, Congress is now considering legislation that would restore
to public employees the right to participate in the political process
by repealing the Hatch Act."ss The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Hatch Act in United States Civil Service
Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, stating
that the government's interests as an employer outweighed employee first amendment rights to participate in the political process.28 4 While there may be legitimate concern that some employers will pressure their employees into making financial
contributions or helping political candidates of the employer's
choice, those concerns should be addressed with narrowly-tailored
remedies penalizing political coercion.
A Bill recently passed the House of Representatives, by a
vote of 305-112, which would allow civil servants to run for office,
manage campaigns, participate in the political process, and solicit
contributions on their own time. 8 If enacted, this bill would do
what the Supreme Court's balancing analysis could not, that being "to restore to Federal civilian employees their right to participate voluntarily, as private citizens, in the political processes of
the Nation, [and] protect such employees from improper political
solications."28 6 The four-part framework of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions instructs that employees should be allowed
to exercise their first amendment rights unless such exercise impairs the efficiency of the workplace or the employee's ability to
perform his or her job. Wholesale prophylactic restrictions on first
amendment rights, whether they take the form of prepublication
review orders or the Hatch Act, are unduly intrusive upon the
constitutional rights of government employees.
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CONCLUSION

The extent to which the government may condition benefits
upon the waiver of constitutional rights has proven to be a vexing
question for the courts. Part of the problem has arisen because of
the inability of some courts to recognize that allocational sanctions can pressure and infringe constitutional rights just as surely
as direct criminal pressures.87 Most of the problem, however, has
been the failure of courts and commentators to develop a consistent framework for analyzing such questions.
This Article has argued that the courts should abandon any
predilections for haphazard balancing or- greater-includes-thelesser arguments in favor of a new, four-part framework that explores the central issues raised by potentially unconstitutional conditions. Such a framework explores the two justifications for treating indirect infringements of constitutional rights differently than
direct prohibitions. This new framework would help focus the
courts' attention on the condition's relationship to the government
program as well as on the amount of pressure on individuals to
participate in the program. This is especially important in the context of First Amendment rights where large systemic benefits flow
from the exercise of the right, benefits that may not be accounted
for by the individual when deciding whether to "sell" the right.
When the framework is applied to the requirement that presidential candidates waive their first amendment right to raise and
spend unlimited private funds as a condition to public financing, it
appears clear that the condition is unconstitutional. The condition
does not further, and in fact may undermine, legitimate government interests. It penalizes constitutionally protected expression,
and allows the government to discriminate between similarly situated candidates. Furthermore, it can be confidently predicted that
the government would continue to provide public financing even
without the requirement that candidates waive their first amendment rights.
When the framework is applied to the various proposals and
efforts that require millions of government employees to waive
their first amendment rights, the framework shows them also to be
largely unconstitutional. In particular, the government violates the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when it requires its employees to submit to prepublication reviews, especially when the
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employees do not have access to classified information. The paucity of evidence that there is a significant problem of unauthorized
disclosures, the inability of prepublication reviews and nondisclosure agreements to remedy such a problem should it exist, the degree to which such programs deter free speech, and the ease with
which they could be used to silence criticisms and politically unpopular views, all show the program to be an unconstitutional penalty on employees' first amendment rights.
The political speech involved in these two examples represents the core of first amendment values. Such speech is important
not only for the self-fulfillment and autonomy its exercise confers
upon the speaker, but also because of its impact on the structure
of government and society. To allow the government to infringe
upon these rights by conditioning employment and federal subsidies upon their waiver is to shift the constitutionally created balance of power from the people to the government. The value of
constitutionally protected liberties is seriously endangered if the
government may condition its many benefits and jobs upon the
waiver of those liberties.

